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Abstract—In the past decades, the blockchain technology has
attracted tremendous attention from both academia and industry.
The popularity of blockchain networks was originated from a
crypto-currency to serve as a decentralized and tamperproof
transaction data ledger. Nowadays, blockchain as the key frame-
work in the decentralized public data-ledger, has been applied to
a wide range of scenarios far beyond crypto-currencies, such as
Internet of Things (IoT), healthcare, and insurance. This survey
aims to fill the gap between the large number of studies on
blockchain network, where game theory emerges as an analytical
tool, and the lack of a comprehensive survey on the game theoreti-
cal approaches applied in blockchain related issues. In this paper,
we review game models proposed to address common issues in the
blockchain network. The issues include security issues, e.g., selfish
mining, majority attack and Denial of Service (DoS) attack, issues
regard mining management, e.g., computational power allocation,
reward allocation, and pool selection, as well as issues regarding
blockchain economic and energy trading. Additionally, we discuss
advantages and disadvantages of these selected game models and
solutions. Finally, we highlight important challenges and future
research directions of applying game theoretical approaches to
incentive mechanism design, and the combination of blockchain
with other technologies.
Index Terms—Blockchain, game theory, security, mining man-
agement.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade, with the popularity of digital crypto-
currencies, e.g., Bitcoin [1], blockchain technology has at-
tracted tremendous attention from both academia and industry
[2]. The blockchain was first proposed in [1] to serve as a
crypto-currency transaction ledger, and is currently widely
adopted for a large number of crypto-currencies, such as
Ethereum [3], Ripple [4], and EOS [5]. The blockchain
technology guarantees the tamperproof ledger, transparent
transactions, and trustless but secure tradings in a decentralized
network. Thus, the blockchain network is recently applied in
a wide range of scenarios far beyond crypto-currencies, such
as Internet of Things (IoT) [6], healthcare [7], and insurance
[8]. In general, blockchain is a distributed public data-ledger
maintained by achieving the consensus among a number of
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nodes in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network. More specifically, the
verified transaction data is stored in a chain of blocks, i.e.,
a basic data structure of blockchain, and the chain grows
in an append-only manner with all new verified blocks to
it. This process involves several operations such as verifying
transactions, disseminating blocks, and attaching blocks to the
blockchain.
As such, the blockchain requires a number of consensus
nodes to participate in the network. The rational nodes per-
form actions or strategies that aim to maximize their own
utility. Moreover, the malicious nodes may launch attacks
that damage the blockchain networks. To address these secu-
rity challenges, consensus protocols such as Byzantine Fault
Tolerance (BFT) protocol [9] can be adopted. However, the
consensus protocols require a centralized permission controller
and only achieve the consensus among a very small group
of nodes. Such a consensus protocol is thus not applicable
to the blockchain network that is a decentralized and large-
scale system. Different optimization approaches and solutions,
e.g., a Markov Decision Process (MDP) [10], are used to
analyze and optimize strategies of the blockchain nodes to
prevent their misbehaviors. However, the optimization ap-
proaches do not take into account the interactions among the
nodes. Recently, game theory [11] has been applied as an
alternative solution in the blockchain network. Game theory
is a study of mathematical models of strategic interaction
between rational decision-makers [12]. Thus, game theory can
be used to analyze the strategies of the consensus nodes as well
as the interactions among them. Through the game theoretical
analysis, the nodes can learn and predict mining behaviors1 of
each other, then having optimal reaction strategies based on
equilibrium analysis. Moreover, game theory can be utilized to
develop incentive mechanisms that discourage the nodes from
executing misbehaviors or launching attacks. As such, game
theory is natural in the decision making of all the consensus
nodes in the blockchain networks.
Currently, there are some surveys related to the blockchain.
However, the existing surveys do not discuss the applications
of the game theory in the blockchain. In particular, the survey
in [13] provides a comprehensive introduction of bitcoin net-
work, the surveys in [14], [15], [16] present security and pri-
vacy issues in the bitcoin network, the survey in [17] presents
the blockchain applications on Internet of Things (IoT), the
survey in [18] discusses the integrations of blockchain and
edge computing. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
survey specifically discussing the use of game theory, as an
1In blockchain systems which incentive nodes to participate in the con-
sensus process of data record with digital tokens, the consensus nodes are
frequently referred as block miners and their operations are referred as mining.
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2efficient analysis tool, in blockchain networks. This motivates
us to deliver the survey with the comprehensive literature
review on the game models in the blockchain network. For
convenience, the related works in this survey are classified
based on issues in the blockchain network. The major issues
consist of (i) security issues such as selfish mining attacks
and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, (ii) mining management
issues such as computational power allocation, fork chain
selection, pool selection, and reward allocation, and (iii)
applications atop the blockchain such as energy trading.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II briefly describes the general architecture of blockchain.
Section III presents the fundamentals of game theory and game
models that are commonly used in blockchain. Section IV
discusses applications of game theory for security issues in
blockchain. Section V presents applications of game theory for
the mining management in blockchain. Section VI discusses
applications of game theory atop blockchain platforms. Section
VII outlines challenges and future research directions. Section
VIII summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS OF BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we give an overview of blockchain on
its concepts, data organization, working mechamism, and
incentive compatibility.
A. Overview of Blockchain
The blockchain was first proposed as a decentralized tam-
perproof ledger which records a set of transactions. These
transactions are verified through a decentralized consensus
process among the trustless agents before attaching to the
chain. Here, we summarize the key advantages that blockchain
networks can offer as follows.
• Decentralized network: Due to the distributed network
which allows every computing unit to utilize its compu-
tational power to take part in the blockchain, and that each
transaction in the blockchain must achieve the agreement
among all the nodes through the consensus protocol, the
monopoly in centralized network can be removed in the
blockchain.
• Tamperproof ledger: The cryptographic techniques used
in blockchain ensure that any change on the transaction
data in blockchain can be observed by all the nodes in
the network. This means that the transaction recorded in
the blockchain cannot be altered and tampered, unless the
majority of nodes are compromised.
• Transparent transaction: All the transactions in the
blockchain can be traced back for verification, and
these transactions are transparent to all the nodes in the
blockchain network.
• Trustless but secure trading: By using the digital asym-
metric key signature, the blockchain network guarantees
that only the sender and receiver which possess the pair
of asymmetric key can execute the transaction, without
intervention of any trust third-party.
B. Data Organization and Workflow of Blockchain
Cryptographic data organization plays an extremely impor-
tant role in the blockchain structure. We first introduce some
basic components supporting the data organization within
blockchain networks.
• Transaction: Transaction is the most basic component of
blockchain. A transaction is proposed by the blockchain
user and is composed of the transaction data which
specifies the value in concern, e.g., the digital tokens in
a crypto-currency, the addresses of the sender and the
receiver, as well as the corresponding transaction fee [1].
• Block: A block is composed of a block header and a
certain amount of transactions. The block header specifies
the hash pointer and merkle tree data structure.
• Hash pointer [13]: The hash pointer of the current block
contains the hash value associated with the previous
block, which also contains the hash pointer to the block
before that one. Thereby, the hash pointers can be used
to build a link of records, i.e., blockchain.
• Merkle Tree [19]: A merkle tree or hash tree is a tree
in which each leaf node is marked by the hash value of
the transaction data of a block, and those non-leaf nodes
are marked by the hash value of the concatenation of its
child nodes. This structure makes it impossible to tamper
the data in blockchain privately.
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Fig. 1: An illustrative example of blockchain data structure
where the transactions are included in the block and the block
is represented by a merkle root.
As shown in Fig. 1, a typical blockchain is an appending-
only, ever-growing list of blocks, which are linked sequentially
using the hash pointers as a linear linked list. More specifically,
the block header includes a hash pointer which is associated
with the previous block, and transaction data is represented as
merkle trees.
Atop the basic cryptographic data organization, maintaining
the blockchain network needs blockchain nodes to dissem-
inate the transaction, store the data into blocks, verify the
transaction, and eventually reach a consensus. The blockchain
working mechanism works as follows (see Fig. 2).
• An initiated transaction is broadcast to the distributed
network through a node.
• The nodes in the blockchain verify the transaction as well
as the node which broadcasts the transaction.
• More than one node may bundle different subset of
newly verified transactions into their candidate blocks and
broadcast them the to the entire network.
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Fig. 2: An overview of the blockchain workflow.
• All or part of the nodes in the blockchain network
participate in the block validation by executing some
certain functions defined by the consensus protocol.
• The verified block is attached to the blockchain, and every
node updates its local replica, i.e., the local views of
whole ledger-data, of the blockchain.
In general, not all the nodes can be authenticated to join
the blockchain network to execute the consensus protocol.
According to the access control scheme [20] that determines
which node can join the network, the blockchain platforms are
classified into permissionless schemes, i.e., public blockchains,
and permissioned schemes including private and consortium
blockchains. When choosing the permissioned access control
scheme, e.g., Hyperledger fabric [21], the consensus needs to
be reached among only a small group of authenticated nodes,
and thus the permissioned blockchain network usually adopts
BFT protocols, e.g., Byzantine Paxos [22]. On the contrary, in
permissionless blockchain, e.g., Ethereum [3], any node can
participate in the network, and some other consensus protocols
are applied, such as Proof of Work (PoW) and Proof of Stake
(PoS). Here we list some widely-used blockchain platforms
and their consensus protocols in Table I.
TABLE I: Some Widely-used Blockchain Platforms
Platform Name Ledger type Consensus Protocol
Bitcoin [1] Public Proof of Work (PoW)
Ethereum [3] Public PoW & Proof of Stake
Hyperledger Fabric [21] Consortium Pluggable algorithm
EOS [5] Private Delegated Proof of Stake
Stellar [23] Public & Private Stellar consensus protocol
Quorum [24] Private Majority voting
Ripple [4] Private Probabilistic voting
C. Incentive Compatibility within Blockchain
In blockchain network, the consensus protocol guarantees
achieving the agreement among the nodes. A reliable consen-
sus protocol needs to satisfy properties [25]. (i) Correctness:
each node adopts the content and the order of transactions
in the confirmed blockchain structure. (ii) Consistency: each
node updates its local blockchain structure if a new block
header is confirmed. (iii) Traceability: all transactions can
be traced back for confirmation. However, in some case,
disagreements may exist among the nodes. For example, the
local blockchain replica of all the nodes are unable to be
synchronized simultaneously due to the distributed network.
Under this case, the nodes might maintain different blockchain
ledgers, and thereby the fork chains appear. This means that
the nodes may deviate from the protocol of maintaining the
longest chain2. Therefore, the blockchain consensus protocol is
expected to be incentive compatible [25]. This means that any
node will suffer from financial loss, e.g., waste of investment
in mining machine, whenever the node deviates from the
protocol.
Currently, the most popular blockchain consensus protocol
is the PoW-based Nakamoto consensus protocol [1]. The
Nakamoto protocol achieves the consensus by solving a math-
ematical puzzle, i.e., by finding a hash value which satisfies
a certain condition. The first node that solves the puzzle can
broadcast the verified block to the blockchain network, and
obtains the reward and the transaction fee. This process of
solving puzzle and obtaining the reward is called mining. The
design of the mining mechanism relies on both cryptography
[26] and game theory [12].
Although the PoW protocol is widely used among the
blockchain platforms, the incentive compatibility of the proto-
col has been openly questioned from game theoretical per-
spectives [27]. The reason is that achieving the Nakamoto
consensus involves nodes joining the network, executing the
protocol, and maintaining the ledger. The nodes may deviate
from the protocol to increase their own utilities. For example,
the node may not broadcast its newly discovered blocks but
choose to withhold the block to increase its utility [25]. The
node trades off between the cost of withholding the block
which is associated with the other nodes’ strategies, and the
mining reward and then chooses its strategy. To analyze the
interactions among these consensus nodes, the game theoret-
ical models (see Section III) are developed and applied [28].
In addition to the security issues, nodes’ mining management
in blockchain, e.g., computational power allocation [29] and
reward allocation [30], adopt game models for the analysis
as well. Apart from the Nakamoto protocol, game models are
also widely used for analyzing the incentive compatibility with
other consensus protocols, e.g., Proof of Stake (PoS) protocol
[31]. Therefore, to easily understand the applications of game
theory in blockchain, the next section presents an overview
and fundamentals of game models used in this survey.
III. OVERVIEW AND FUNDAMENTALS OF GAME THEORY
Game theory provides a set of mathematical tools for
analyzing the interaction among rational decision-makers. In
a game, each decision-maker as a player chooses its strategy
to maximize its utility, given the other players’ strategies. The
following briefly presents the game theoretic approaches which
have been widely applied to analyze the interactions within the
blockchain network. To interpret the definition of the game,
some important terminologies are given below.
• Player: A player is a decision-maker in the game. In the
blockchain, players can be miners, mining pools, or the
blockchain users.
• Utility: A utility, i.e., a payoff, an interest, or a revenue
reflects the player’s expected outcome.
2 Due to the different strategies that nodes make to maximize their own
utilities, the nodes may attach new verified blocks to the different blocks in
blockchain, and thereby fork chains appear. The consensus protocols regulate
the nodes to apply their work on the longest chain.
4• Strategy: A player’s strategy is a set of actions, choices
or decisions that the player can perform to achieve
its expected outcome. In general, the player’s utility is
determined based on not only the player’s own strategy,
but also the other players’ strategies.
• Rationality: A player is rational, i.e., self-interested, if the
player always maximizes its own payoff.
A. Non-cooperative Game
In a non-cooperative game, the players do not cooperate
by forming coalitions or by reaching agreements. In general,
the term non-cooperative does not imply that the players
do not cooperate with each other, but it means that any
cooperation which might arise must be with no communication
of strategies among the players. In other words, the strategy
that the player takes must be spontaneous, and each player is
rational.
Consider a blockchain network in which miners as the
players invest strategically in computational power to com-
pete for a reward from mining successfully. The miners are
rational and the non-cooperative game can be used to model
the interaction among the miners. Assume that there are N
miners, i.e., players, and Pi is a set of strategies of miner
i, where P = P1 × · · · × PN is the Cartesian product
of the sets of individual strategies. Let pi ∈ Pi be the
strategy of miner i. A vector of strategies of N miner is
p = (p1, . . . , pN ), and a vector of corresponding payoffs is
pi = (pi1(p), . . . , piN (p)) ∈ RN , where pii(p) is the utility of
player i, e.g., mining rewards or the transaction fees, given
the miner’s chosen strategy and strategies of the others. Each
miner chooses its best strategy p∗i to maximize its utility. A set
of strategies p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ) ∈ P is the Nash equilibrium
if no miner can gain higher utility by changing its own strategy
when the strategies of the other miners remain unchanged, i.e.,
∀i, pi ∈ Pi : pii(p∗i ,p∗i ) ≥ pii(pi,p∗i ), (1)
where pi = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . . , pN ) is a vector of strat-
egy of all miners except miner i.
The inequality in (1) demonstrates the equilibrium state
of the game. At the Nash equilibrium, the players have no
incentive to deviate from their current strategies. However,
there is no Nash equilibrium in some cases, or multiple
equilibria exist. Thus, it is important to check the existence
and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium to analyze a non-
cooperative game. The existence and uniqueness of equilib-
rium theory [32] demonstrates that the strictly concave game
can achieve the unique equilibrium asymptotically. Here, the
concave game means that the utility functions of players are
concave, and this can be proved by computing the second-
order derivative of the utility function [12].
The non-cooperative theory can be applied to a broad range
of blockchain based scenarios. For example, it can be used for
computational power allocation [29] or fork chain selection
[33]. Also, it can be used for pool selection regarding the
mining rewards allocation [30]. Atop the blockchain based
platform, the non-cooperative game theory is applied to ana-
lyze the interaction between blockchain users and miners, e.g.,
cheating among the buyers and sellers in blockchain network
[34]. Moreover, it is widely adopted in analysis of security
issues within the blockchain, e.g., pool block withholding
attacks [35].
B. Extensive-form Game
The aforementioned non-cooperative game can be used to
analyze both the static game, i.e., the game that has no notion
of time and no player has any knowledge of other players’
actions in advance, and the dynamic game, i.e., the game
in which the players’ strategies are made following a certain
predefined order. The dynamic game can be represented in an
extensive form to illustrate the sequencing of players’ possible
moves, their choices at every decision point, information that
each player has about the other players’ moves, and their
payoffs for all possible game outcomes. In game theory,
the extensive-form game describes the interaction among the
players using a game tree illustrating decisions made at
different points with their payoffs represented at the end of
each branch. Consider the scenario of fork chain selection, the
miner chooses a certain chain to mine on at the beginning of
every round of mining competition, given the actions taken by
the other players in previous mining rounds. At some points,
the blockchain forks and leads to the structure similar to a
branching tree. Thus, the tree-like extensive-form game can
be efficiently applied for the analysis as shown in Fig. 3 in
which the players can choose between two chains to mine.
2
2
1
(0,0)
(2,1)
(1,2)
(3,1)
C1
C1
C1
C2
C2
C2
Miner 1
Miner 2
Fig. 3: The game has two players, i.e., miner 1 and miner 2.
The initial node belongs to miner 1 meaning that the miner 1
makes its strategy first. The miner 1 chooses between Chain 1,
i.e., C1, and Chain 2, i.e., C2. The miner 2 chooses between
C1 and C2 after its observation of the action of miner 1. There
are four payoffs represented by the four terminal nodes of the
game tree: (C1,C1), (C1,C2), (C2,C1) and (C2,C2).
Assume that an extensive-form game is composed of many
smaller games, i.e., subgames. Each subgame can be ex-
pressed as a static non-cooperative game. A set of strategies
p∗ = (p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N ) ∈ P is a subgame perfect equilibrium if it
represents a Nash equilibrium of every subgame. A common
method for obtaining the subgame perfect equilibrium in an
extensive-form game is backward induction. The backward
induction first considers the decision that might be made in the
last move and then reasons back from the end of the problem
to the previous one until the induction reaches the first move
of the game. In the game as presented in Fig. 3, if miner 1
5chooses C2, miner 2 will choose C1 to maximize its utility and
miner 1 receives 1. If miner 1 chooses C1, miner 2 will choose
C2 and miner 1 receives 2. Therefore, miner 1 prefers choosing
C1 and miner 2 choosing C2. The strategies of miners are
the Nash equilibrium of each subgame and thus achieve the
subgame perfect equilibrium.
In blockchain based platform, the extensive-form game is
applied for selection of entering the blockchain market or not
[36], selection of transactions to be included in the block [37],
and optimization of pool’s mining rewards allocation [38]. The
extensive-form game has been also adopted for analyzing the
security issues within the blockchain. It was used to analyze
the selection of fork chain [39], determination of forming the
collusion [40], and cheating among the blockchain users [41].
C. Stackelberg Game
Similar to the extensive-form game, another game that
involves in a certain predefined ordered strategies taken by
players is Stackelberg game [12]. In the Stakelberg game, the
players include leaders and followers. The followers decide
their strategies after observing the strategies of the leaders.
Both the leaders and the followers are typically rational that
aim to maximize their own utilities.
To understand how the Stackelberg game works, we con-
sider a blockchain based edge computing network which
involves two players, i.e., the service provider and the miner
[42]. The service provider possesses the computational power
which can be offered to the miner as service, and the provider
can set the service price to charge the fee for profit. The
miner optimizes its demand of computational power to the
provider to maximize its utility, taking its cost into account.
As such, the service provider sets the price first, and then the
miner decides its demand. Thus, the Stackelberg game can
be used to model the interaction between the service provider
and the miner. Assume P1 and P2 are the sets of strategies of
the service provider and the miner, respectively. The service
provider chooses its strategy p1 from set P1 to maximize its
utility pi1(p1, p2), and the miner chooses its strategy p2 from
set P2 to maximize its utility pi2(p1, p2). The optimization
problems of the leader and the follower together form the
Stackelberg game. The objective of such a game is to find
a Stackelberg equilibrium.
Definition 1. Let BR2(p1) define the best response mapping
of the follower. Then, the point (p∗1, p
∗
2) is called the Stackel-
berg equilibrium of the game if the following conditions hold:
• p∗2 ∈ BR2(p∗1), and
• p∗1 ∈ argmax
p1
max
p2∈BR2(p1)
pi(p1, p2).
To find the Stackelberg equilibrium, the backward induction
method is typically used. Since the leader first takes its strategy
and then the follower chooses its strategy, the Stackelberg
strategy guarantees the service provider to achieve its payoff
at least as much as the corresponding Nash equilibrium. The
reason is that when choosing the Stackelberg strategy, the
service provider actually optimizes its decision which will
maximize its utility. This feature makes the Stackelberg game
suitable for many scenarios in blockchain based applications.
For example, the Stackelberg game is adopted for setting
transaction fees and selection of miners for verification [43],
determination of cyber-insurance price [44], and analyzing
the supply-demand relationship in the blockchain based edge
computing platform [45].
D. Stochastic Game
A stochastic game can be seen as several static non-
cooperative games that are repeated over time. Each static non-
cooperative game is called state of the game. The stochastic
game executes stochastic transitions among the states of the
game. In the stochastic game, the players can change their
strategies based on the past actions and transitions behaviors
of the other players [46].
The stochastic game can be applied efficiently to analyze the
miners’ selection of chains to mine (see Section II) regarding
the transitions of blockchain structure. The stochastic game
typically is composed of (i) a finite set I of players , e.g., the
miners, (ii) a space M of states, e.g., blockchain structures,
(iii) a strategy set S, and (iv) a transition probability P from
M × S. Each miner has a payoff function gn which is often
taken to be the discounted sum of the stage payoffs. The game
starts at an initial state m1, and at stage t, each miner observes
the blockchain structure mt and then chooses its strategy sit,
i.e., selects a chain to mine. Every miner receives an immediate
payoff gin associated with the current state and the miners’
strategies. Then, the game moves to a new state mt+1. The
game process is repeated until it reaches a common solution
called Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) [47] that is the
refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium (see Section III-
B). The Markov perfect equilibrium is a set of strategies that
achieve the Nash equilibrium of every state of the stochastic
game [12]. In the case of fork chain selection, following the
Nakamoto protocol, i.e., mining on the longest chain, is the
Markov equilibrium.
Apart from the chain selection, the stochastic game can
be used for mining management. For example, the selection
between investing in computational power or leaving the
mining [48], and the selection of chain to mine [49]. Moreover,
stochastic game has also been widely applied to security
issues. It was used to analyze the selection between honest
mining and selfish mining [50], the decision of the proper time
to release the mined block [28], and the selection of adding a
block to the chain [51].
IV. APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY
A. Selfish Mining Attack
Selfish mining is a type of subversive strategies in PoW
based blockchain systems [52] that attackers, i.e., malicious
miners or mining pools, may not broadcast the newly mined
blocks but choose to (i) withhold the block or (ii) hold and
then release the block at a proper time. Under this case, honest
miners waste their computational power in finding the block
discovered already, and malicious miners can therby increase
their probability of finding the next block. The pool block
withholding (PBWH) attack is one common selfish mining
attack [53]. In the PBWH attack, the attacking pool infiltrates
the attacked pool, and the infiltrating miners perform the block
6withholding (BWH) attack, i.e., withhold all the blocks newly
discovered in the attacked pool. To prevent such an attack, it
is crucial to analyze strategies of the miners and pools as well
as the interaction among them. A Markov Decision Process
(MDP) [54] can be used to analyze the strategy and utility
of the individual player, i.e., the miner or the pool. However,
the MDP does not take into account the interaction among
multiple players. Alternatively, game theory can be effectively
applied.
The authors in [35] adopt a non-cooperative game to analyze
the interaction among the pools. This scenario is illustrated
in Fig. 4 with two selfish pools as players. The strategy of
each player is to determine its infiltration rate, i.e., the fraction
of its computational power for performing the infiltration. In
the case of attack, the attacking pool obtains its utility not
only from its honest miners, but also from the infiltrating
miners that perform the BWH attack within the attacked pool.
The objective of the player is to optimize its infiltration rate
thereby maximizing its utility. In particular, the player’s utility
is a function of the computational power and the infiltration
rate. By using the second-order derivative with respect to the
infiltration rate, the utility function is proved to be concave.
Thus, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which neither
players can improve its own utility by changing its strategy,
i.e., the infiltrate rate. At the equilibrium, the infiltrate rate
is always greater than zero. This means that launching the
PBWH attack is always the best response of each player.
Simulation results illustrate that the pool can improve its utility
by launching the PBWH attack only when the pool controls a
strict majority of the total computational power. However, in
the case that two pools attack with each other, the utility of
each pool is less than that if neither pool attacks.
Miners
Pool 1
Bitcoin Network
Infiltration
Pool 2
Miners Miners
Fig. 4: Two pools case that both pools launch the PBWH
attack, i.e., infiltrates each other with its miners that perform
the BWH attack [35].
The case in [35] is similar to the famous Prisoners’ Dilemma
in game theory [12] that results in the utility loss of the miners.
To avoid the miners’ dilemma, the miners can choose one of
the solutions as follows. The first solution is that the miners
would intend to join private pools that will not involve the
PWH attack. As a result, big mining pools may be divided
into many small pools spontaneously, and eventually this may
lead to a better environment for the Bitcoin system as a whole.
The second solution is that the miners perform so-called Zero
Determinant (ZD) strategies [68]. This solution is presented
in [50] that the authors model a two-miner mining case as a
stochastic iterative game.
Different from a typical strategy that aims to improve
players’ own profits, the ZD strategy is used to control an
outcome of the opponents in a certain range so as to avoid a
low social welfare, i.e., the whole pool’s profit [69]. In this
game, the two players are an altruistic miner, i.e., a miner
which attempts to maximize the social welfare, and a selfish
miner, i.e., a miner which only aims to improve its own profit.
Their strategies include cooperation, i.e., mining honestly,
and launching the BWH attack to the other miner. Note that
the altruistic miner and selfish miner choose their strategies
probabilistically based on each other’s strategy selected in the
last iteration. The analysis shows that so long as the altruistic
miner applies strategies according to the determinant function,
i.e., a linear function which is associated with players’ profit
factor, the profit of the selfish miner is in a range from mutual
cooperation to mutual attack regardless of strategies adopted
by the selfish miner. Thus, the altruistic miner can indeed
motivate the selfish miner to mine cooperatively by performing
ZD strategies so as to restrict the selfish miner’s profit to
achieve the highest social welfare. The simulation results show
that the proposed game can achieve a higher social welfare
than that of the pool game proposed in [35]. However, the
proposed game does not consider the profit of the altruistic
miner. This means that the altruistic miner may not have an
incentive to perform the ZD strategy.
The two-pool-attacker scenario in [50] can also be found in
[56]. However, in addition to the PBWH attack, the authors
in [56] consider the miners’ migration among the pools. In
particular, the miners of a pool can be migrated to another pool
and launch the PBWH attack to increase the profit. To analyze
the average payoff of the miner and the miners’ stochastic mi-
gration process, the Concurrent Mean-payoff Game (CMPG)
is adopted as presented in [56]. CMPG (see Section III) is
a two-player game with a finite state space where at each
state, both players choose their strategies simultaneously [46].
Here, the players are pool 1 and pool 2, and the state of the
game includes the number of migrated miners of pool 1 and
that of pool 2. The strategy of a pool is to determine (i) the
number of its miners to be migrated to the other pool and (ii)
the miners which perform the PBWH attack. The number of
migrated miners is determined depending on the attractiveness
levels of the other pool, i.e., the ratio of the pool’s total mining
reward to the total computational power of its miners. If a pool
is infiltrated by miners of the other pool, the attractiveness
level of the pool decreases. This decrease can be observed
by the whole blockchain network, and thus the other pool
can adjust its migration strategy based on the observations. In
general, the pool’s profit depends not only on the state, i.e.,
the allocation of miners for migration, but also on its chosen
strategy. The experimental results show that if the miners in
pool 1 stochastically migrate to pool 2 according to the pool
2’s attractiveness level, then the mean-payoff objective, i.e.,
the average profit, of pool 2 can be guaranteed against any
strategy of pool 1. However, the mean-payoff objective may
not be guaranteed in multi-player scenarios. Such a scenario
can be investigated in the future work.
The aforementioned approaches, i.e., [35], [50] and [56],
are constrained to the interaction among only two pools.
Considering a multi-pool scenario, the authors in [55] adopt
the Computational Power Splitting (CPS) game [70] to model
the PBWH attack. To improve their expected payoffs, the
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REF. GAME MODEL PLAYER ACTION STRATEGY PAYOFF SOLUTION
Se
lfi
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M
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g
A
tta
ck
[35]
Non-cooperative
game Mining pools
Infiltrate other pools
to launch BWH
attack
Determination of the
infiltration rate
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[55] Splitting game
One miner and
pools
Distribute mining
power for selfish
mining
Determination of the power
distribution
Mining rewards
minus cost
Mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium
[56]
Mean-payoff
game Mining pools
Migrate to other
pools to launch
PBWH attack
Determination of the
migration rate Mean-payoff
Mean-payoff
objective
[50] Stochastic game Miners
Block withholding
(BWH) attack
Selection between honest
mining and selfish mining Social welfare
Zero-
Determinant
strategy
[57]
Non-cooperative
game Miners
Selfish propagation
attack
Selection of identity
duplication and transactions
relaying
Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[33]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Fork chain Selection of fork to mine Transaction fees Nash equilibrium
[58]
Non-cooperative
game Miners
Delay submitting
shares
Decision of the proper time to
submit shares Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[28]
Non-cooperative
game Miners
Select or create a
chain to mine Selection of the chain to mine Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
m
aj
or
ity
A
tta
ck
[28] Stochastic game Miners BWH attack
Decision of the proper time to
release the block Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[59]
Non-cooperative
game Miners
Post smart contract
transaction of
mining on private
chain
Selection between working on
smart contract transaction and
honestly mining
Transaction fees
and mining
rewards
Nash equilibrium
[51] Stochastic game Miners
Compete to fork
chain
Selection of adding the block
to the chain
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[60]
Non-cooperative
game
Attacking and
defending miners
Issue whale
transaction to attract
miners mine on the
private chain
Determination of the
threshold of attack cost and
block selection
Mining reward
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[61] Sequential game
Attacking and
defending miners
Buy stake to launch
majority attack
Determine the cost of attack
and selling selection
Function of profit
and interest Nash equilibrium
[28]
Non-cooperative
game
Attacking and
defending miners Goldfinger attack
Decision of forming cartel
and determination of the tax
paid to the attacker
Profits minus cost Nash equilibrium
[43]
Stackelberg
game
Blockchain users
and miners
Form cartel to
launch majority
attack
Setting transaction fee and
selection of recruiting miners Profits minus cost
Stackelberg
equilibrium
D
oS
A
tta
ck
[62]
Non-cooperative
game Mining pools DDoS attack
Selection of launching attack
or not Profits minus cost Nash equilibrium
[63] Sequential game Mining pools DDoS attack Chosen of the attack level Profits minus cost Nash equilibrium
[64] Repeated game Mining pools
DDoS attack under
a reputation-based
scheme
Selection of launching attack
or not
Profits associate
with the loss of
reputation
Nash equilibrium
[65]
Non-cooperative
game
One server and
devices
DDoS attack in
edge network
Selection between executing
or sending request and
launching attack
Profits minus cost Nash equilibrium
O
th
er
se
cu
ri
ty
is
su
es
[66]
Non-cooperative
game
Groups of
information
sharing network
Form group and
infiltrate other
groups to withhold
data
Determination of infiltration
rate Profits minus cost Nash equilibrium
[40]
Extensive-form
game
Clouds of cloud
computing
network
Collude to output
the same wrong data Selection of collusion or not
Function of
payment and
deposit
Sequential
equilibrium
[41]
Extensive-form
game
Buyer and seller
of the blockchain
trading system
Cheats of buyer or
seller Selection of cheating or not
Profits associated
with deposits
Subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium
[34]
Non-cooperative
game
Buyer and seller
of the blockchain
trading system
Cheats of buyer or
seller Selection of cheating or not
Profits associated
with deposits Nash equilibrium
[67]
Coordination
game
Voter and
verifiers
Manipulate data of
data verification
system
Statement of the correctness
of data
Profits associated
with deposits Nash equilibrium
[44]
Stackelberg
game
Blockchain
users, one
provider, and
one insurer
Purchase insurance
to compensate for
the attack
Determination of the service
price, service demand, and
insurance price
Profits minus cost Stackelbergequilibrium
8players, i.e., the miners or the pools which own positive
computational power, can choose to (i) attack other pools,
i.e., distribute their computational power to other pools and
launch the BWH attack, and (ii) honestly follow or arbitrarily
deviate from the pool’s protocol. In the case that the player
chooses to attack, the strategy of the player is to determine
(i) the distribution of its computational power, and (ii) the
portion of its mining power holding attack as presented in
Fig. 5. The objective is to maximize the player’s profit, which
is defined as the sum of mining rewards received from all
the pools. For any given strategies of the other miners, there
always exists a computational power allocation for a miner
to increase its profit and cause the other pool a loss. In
other words, honestly mining is not the best response of the
players and the game thus has no pure Nash Equilibrium
strategy. Nonetheless, the game has a unique mixed strategy
equilibrium at which each player has an incentive to launch
the PBWH attack probabilistically rather than mining honestly.
Simulation result shows that the best strategy of the players is
to comply with the following rules. First, the players launch
the PBWH attack which improves their profits. Second, the
attackers spend the computational power less than a specific
fraction on the PBWH attack to gain more profit than mining
honestly. Finally, the attackers should attack big pools rather
than small pools. Both work in [35] and [55] arrive at some
consistent findings from different perspective.
Bitcoin Network
Pool 1
  Player α 
𝛽1 
Pool 2
Pool 
n-1
Pool n...
𝛽2 𝛽𝑖  𝛽𝑛−1 𝛽𝑛  
Fig. 5: The player α distributes its computational power to
several pools and launchs the BWH attack, where α is the
computational power owned by the player, and βi represents
the fraction of mining power that the player allocates to the
pool i [55].
The approaches discussed above, i.e., [35] and [55], con-
sider only the mining reward. In practice, the Bitcoin systems
also provide the transaction fee [1]. When the block creation
reward dominates the mining reward, the miners may not
broadcast transactions to the others immediately so as to
increase their expected profits [71]. This is called selfish propa-
gation attack. To address the attack, the authors in [57] propose
an incentive mechanism for the miners to propagate the trans-
actions. The proposed mechanism is designed such that each
miner receives a propagation reward from the blockchain sys-
tem according to its behaviors in the propagation process (see
Section II-B). To maximize the gained propagation reward,
each miner strategically chooses to duplicate itself, i.e., add
fake identities before relaying the transaction, or to relay the
transaction immediately, given the strategy profile of the other
miners. The interaction among the miners can be modeled as
a non-cooperative game as presented in [57]. In the game,
the players are miners which are aware of the transaction.
Each player not only strategically relays the transaction but
also works on PoW. The authorizing player, i.e., the player
which solves the PoW, and the players which are in the same
relay chain with the authorizing player gain a certain reward.
Other players gain nothing. This scenario is illustrated in
Fig. 6. By using the iterative removal of dominated strategies
[12], the game is proved to admit a unique Nash equilibrium.
At the Nash equilibrium, only transaction propagating and
no-duplication strategies, i.e., the Nash equilibrium strategy,
survive after dominated strategy removal. However, if there
are not sufficient players which are connected with each other,
the selfish propagation attack cannot be guaranteed to be
prevented.
𝑇1 𝑇2 𝑇3 𝑇3
′  𝑇4 𝑇5 𝑇3
′′  
Transaction 
relay chain
Propagation 
reward
α α α α α α 
3α total 
Duplications of 𝑇3 
β 
𝑇𝑖 
𝑇𝑗  
… 
… 
Fig. 6: An example of the transaction relay process that the
transaction flows from T1 to T5. T1 to T4 relay the transaction
thus gain reward α. T5 solves the PoW thus gains reward β.
T3 adds two fake identities, i.e., T
′
3 and T
′′
3 , before relaying
the transaction thereby gains 3α in total [57].
Other works on understanding the vulnerability of propa-
gation mechanism without mining rewards can also be found
in [28], [72], [73]. The authors in [33] demonstrate that with
only block creation rewards, it is attractive enough for miners
to extend the blocks that have the most available transaction
fees rather than to follow the longest chain. Each miner intends
to fork the head of the chain actively and leaves transactions
unclaimed selectively to maximize its profit. Such an attack
is called undercutting attack, and the miner that performs
the undercutting attack is called undercutter. The scenario is
illustrated as in Fig. 7 where “Option Two” corresponds to
the undercutting attack. If the miner performs the undercutting
strategy, it may gain nothing if its block is not in the longest
chain eventually. The undercutter strategically performs un-
dercutting strategy so as to attract the other miners to mine
on the forked chain. Meanwhile, the other miners consider
whether to mine on the forked chain or not to maximize
their profits. Thus, the interaction among the miners can be
modeled as a repeated game that in every stage of mining, each
miner chooses to perform honest mining or undercutting. The
game theoretical analysis shows that if a miner’s undercutting
strategy follows a certain function to maximize the size of
the block, then the strategy is also the best response for all
miners. This is under the constraint that if the miners fork,
they must perform undercutting. Thus, the Nash equilibrium
exists as all miners adopt the same undercutting strategy. The
simulation results show that when each miner applies a no-
regret learning algorithm, even with 66% of miners mining
9honestly, undercutting is profitable than mining honestly. As a
result, there could be many unclaimed transactions left which
is detrimental to the whole blockchain network. The same
conclusion is reached in [74] through a non-game theoretical
method. However, if the simulation takes network latency into
account, the undercutters may have sufficient time to include
all the transactions into the block, and thus the undercutters
have no incentive to leave any transaction to the next miner.
Possible Scenario: Head of the 
longest chain contains 500 units of 
transaction fees. 20 units remain.
500 20
Option One: Extend the longest 
chain. Claim 20 units for self, 
leave 0 for next miner.
500 20
Option Two: Fork the longest 
chain. Claim 270 units for self, 
leave 250 for next miner.
500
250
0
270
Fig. 7: An example of undercutting attack. Option one corre-
sponds to honest mining that the miner mines on the longest
chain. The miner in Option Two performs undercutting attack
that forks the longest chain and claims more reward compared
with that of option one [33].
Different from attacks among the pools, another variation of
selfish mining attack inside the mining pool which performs
on the pay per last N shares (PPLNS) [75] is introduced in
[58]. PPLNS is a popular pool mining reward mechanism.
Instead of distributing a block reward among miners in the
pool in the current round, PPLNS distributes the reward
among miners that have submitted shares3 already in the latest
PPLNS window. The PPLNS window includes the number of
shares submitted continuously that the latest share is the full
solution of PoW. Specifically, shares in the PPLNS window
are regarded as the effective shares. The miner that submits
effective shares obtains the reward according to its proportion
of all effective shares. Under this mechanism, the miner may
launch the delay attack. In the delay attack, the miner first
delays submitting the shares, i.e., by holding the discovered
shares, if the miner finds the solution of PoW, the miner
releases all delayed shares and then submits the solution
immediately. Thus, more reward can be obtained because of
the higher fraction of shares in the latest PPLNS window. This
scenario is illustrated in Fig 8.
For each miner in the same pool, there are two phases during
mining. In the first phase, the miner only collects shares for
delay. In the second phase, the miner submits every share
immediately, i.e., through honest mining. To maximize the
expected profit of launching the delay attack, each miner needs
to choose proper time to transit its phase according to the
strategies of the other miner. Otherwise, the miner may lose
the reward of all its delayed shares. Thus, the authors in [58]
model the interaction between miners in the same pool as a
non-cooperative game. It is proved that the Nash equilibrium
exists if the computational power of the most powerful miner
3 A share is a hash value which is easier to be found, compared with the
valid hash of the block. This means that shares can be used to measure the
computational power that miner possesses.
2 1 2 1 1 2 $ 1 2 1 2 $ 1 1 2 2 2 2 $... ...
N
N
N
1
Miner 1 Share
2
Miner 2 Share
$ -- Solution of Pow, N=7
Miner 2 launches 
a delay attack
Pool with PPLNS
Fig. 8: An example of delay attack in a pool with PPLNS.
The pool includes two miners, i.e., miner 1 and miner 2. The
size of PPLNS window in this case is 7. Miner 2 launches a
delay attack [58].
meets a certain condition. This condition is associated with the
PPLNS window size, and complexity of finding the solution
of PoW. At the Nash equilibrium, each miner of the pool
is at the turning point between two phases. This means that
the miner has no incentive to deviate from honest mining,
and thus the miner would not delay its shares. Such a pool
is called the incentive compatible pool. Simulation results
show that if the pool is not incentive compatible, although
the fraction of delaying miners decreases with a parameter
related to the window size and the complexity of solving PoW,
regardless of power distribution, the game cannot reach the
Nash equilibrium.
B. Majority Attack
The security of blockchain is achieved through the dis-
tributed consensus of miners. This consensus is only reliable
with the assumption that no single miner can hold more than
50% of the network’s computational power [1]. Theoretically,
to gain its profit, the miner invests more in the computational
power, and it may possess more than 50% of the network’s
computational power [30]. In this case, the miner would
be able to halt payments, reverse transactions, prevent new
transactions from confirmation, and double-spend coins [2],
[27], [76]–[81]. The attack is called 51% attack. As such,
the assumption of the distributed consensus may not be valid
any longer, and the security of blockchain is not guaranteed.
More specifically, theoretical analyses [54], [59], [82] show
that the miner which possesses only a relatively large part
computational power can also achieve the similar goal. In
general, we label this type of attack associated with a large
group of miners as the majority attack.
When the majority attack is performed, mining on the fork
chain may happen. The condition under which a miner has an
incentive to mine on the fork is investigated in [28]. Although
the miners follow the longest chain rule under the Nakamoto
protocol, at some points, the chain can fork that leads to a
structure similar to a branching tree [83]. To maximize the
profit, i.e., the reward of creation of a new block, each miner
aims to extend selectively any of the existing branches or to
create a new branch, given the strategy of the other miners. A
non-cooperative game can thus be applied. Since if more than
50% of the network’s total computational power are extending
the longest chain, deviating from honest mining only leads
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to the waste of the miner’s computational power of mining.
The reason is that the mined block would not achieve the
Nakamoto consensus with the majority of miners and thereby
be orphaned. This lowers the miner’s profit, and thus following
the longest chain would be the best response of the rest of other
miners. Therefore, the game has a Nash equilibrium in which
all miners extend the longest chain. If a cartel of miners which
possesses more than 50% of the network’s computational
power forks a chain, following the rule of longest chain would
not be the best response for the other non-cartel miners, and
thus the Nash equilibrium will be shifted to another one that
every miner mines on the fork. Similar conclusion is reached
in [82]. If the fraction of computational power deviating from
extending the longest chain is more than a value around 1/4,
each miner has an incentive to mine on the fork.
Compared with [28], a more general majority attack where
the miner can not only choose which branches to mine but
also determine whether or not to release the mined block
is investigated in [84]. The miner can probabilistically hide
newly mined blocks and mine on the fork. Since this is similar
to that the miners play a game with incomplete information
of blockchain state among each other [85], a stochastic game
can be applied as presented in [84]. The miner’s expected
utility is a function of the miner’s action, i.e., the allocation
of the miner’s computational power, and the current state of
the game, i.e., the structure of the block tree at present. In the
case that the miner’s computational power is equal to a profit
threshold, the expected utility of mining on a fork is equal to
that of mining on the longest chain regardless of the current
state. Thereby, when the miner’s computational power is less
than the profit threshold, the miner has no incentive to deviate
from mining on the longest chain which is the best response of
the miner and the Nash equilibrium can be obtained. As shown
in the simulation results, when the obtained profit threshold
is approximately 0.42, the miner with at most 36% of the
total computational power cannot gain more than 36% of the
total rewards. Meanwhile, the miner with computational power
more than 46% always has an incentive to deviate from the
longest chain rule. These results are more accurate than that
obtained by MDP-based scheme [54].
Furthermore, by using the smart contract [86], the authors in
[59] illustrate that the miner or the pool which controls only
38.2% of the network’s total computational power can gain
more reward by deviating from the protocol. The attacking
miner uses its full computational power to mine on its private
chain while posting a smart contract transaction. This contract
transaction includes a hashing puzzle, i.e., the solution of PoW,
of its private chain. Any miner that solves the puzzle can
receive the reward from the puzzle’s giver, i.e., the attacker,
in exchange for the solution. Thereby, the attacker may gain
more profit when its private chain is longer than the public one.
For each time that the attacker posts a hashing puzzle through
the smart contract, the other miners have two strategies: (i)
work on the puzzle in the contract, and (ii) mine on the
public chain. Each miner tries to maximize its expected utility,
given the set of strategies of the other miners. The interaction
among the miners except the attacker can thus be modeled as
a non-cooperative game. When the attacker controls more than
38.2% of the network’s total computational power, the miner’s
utility of working on the puzzle with probability α is greater
than that of the mining the longest chain, and the attack is thus
launched successfully. This means that each miner will work
on the puzzle with probability α and mine on the public chain
with probability 1 − α. Thus, the game is proved to admit a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The game in [59] is under
the assumption that miners always mine on the longest chain.
However, if some miners perform the selfish mining strategy,
the reward of solving the hashing puzzle on a private chain
provided by the attacker may not be attractive enough to the
other miners. Thus, the attack may fail.
In addition to posting the smart contract as presented in
[59], majority attack can also be launched by the attackers
offering monetary bribes [87]. To prolong the fork chain
thereby increasing its successful attack probability, the attacker
can attract other rational miners to mine on the fork by issuing
a whale transaction, i.e., a transaction with a high transaction
fee. Since issuing the whale transaction is similar to bribing
the other miners, such an attack is also called bribery attack
[88]. The attacker’s problem is to determine the cost of the
attack, i.e., the transaction fee, to maximize its profit. Also, the
other miners’ problem is to trade off the profit of mining on the
fork against the reward of mining on the public chain. A non-
cooperative game can be thus used to model the interaction
between the attacker and the other miners as presented in [60].
Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show that if the
attacker’s mining power is greater than a profit threshold, the
cost of the attack decreases, i.e., the attacker’s profit increases,
as the attacker’s mining power increases. Here, the profit
threshold is a function of the computational power used to
mine on the fork, and the number of blocks by which the fork
chain is ahead of the public chain. Meanwhile, any miner
that possesses as much mining power as the attacker’s has
an incentive to mine on the fork chain. However, the Nash
equilibrium of the game is not discussed.
To avoid such majority attack, the existing miners can act
as a defender actively adding honest nodes to the blockchain
network. This case is investigated in [51]. The system model
consists of one attacker, i.e., the miner which intends to fork a
private chain, and one defender, i.e., the miner which honestly
mines on the public chain. To obtain the mining rewards, the
attacker and the defender compete to build the blocks for the
private and public chains in a sequence of stages, respectively.
The historical strategies and the probabilistic stage transitions
can be observed by both the attacker and the defender. Thus,
the interaction between the attacker and the defender can be
modeled as a stochastic game. In the game, the strategies of
the defender are (i) defending, i.e., actively adding the honest
nodes to avoid the majority attack, and (ii) doing nothing, i.e.,
letting the blockchain network run as usual. If the winning
probability of the attacker to fork successfully is greater than
a certain value, the defender’s utility of defending is greater
than that of doing nothing. This means that the defending
strategy is the best response of the defender and the game
reaches the Nash equilibrium. Here, the value is a determined
based on the cost of adding honest nodes, the number of nodes
added actively to the blockchain network, and the total mining
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power that the attacker has. Otherwise, the defender has no
incentive to avoid the attack. However, the simulation results
should use actual data gathered from real blockchain networks,
e.g., Blockr.io [89] and Blockchain.info [90], to verify the
practicability of the game model.
The aforementioned approaches, i.e., [51], [59], [60], [84],
consider the motivation of the attack within the system.
However, the attacker’s motivation can be also based on the
incentive outside the system and this type of attack is called
Goldfinger attack [91]. The attacker, i.e., miners, can receive
some utility from devaluing the cryptocurrency (a.k.a. currency
measured in digital tokens in the blockchain network), by
forming a cartel to impair the consensus among miners, i.e.,
launch the majority attack. The defenders, i.e., the other
miners, intend to preserve the value of the currency. To prevent
the currency from being devalued, the defender makes a bid,
i.e., similar to a tax to keep the currency alive, to the attacker.
Meanwhile, the defender trades off the cost of making the
bid and the profit of preserving the currency. Therefore, a
non-cooperative game can be used to model the interaction
between the attacker and the defender as presented in [28]. The
utility of the miner is a function of the value of the currency,
the bid, and the possibility of the currency being attacked.
The analysis shows that the defender can maximize its utility
by using the first-order optimality condition in which the bid
satisfies a certain constraint associated with the computational
power distribution. If such a bid exists, the game is at the Nash
equilibrium point where the attacker has no incentive to attack.
Otherwise, the currency will have a zero value. However, in a
real case, the defender does not know the attacker’s expected
utility. If the attacker makes a strong claim about the imminent
attack, the defender has no incentive to preserve the currency
because of the possible high cost and thus no equilibrium
exists.
Apart from the PoW system, the majority attack happens
in Proof-of-Stake (PoS) systems [31]. In a PoS system, each
agent, i.e., a stake-holder, can earn interest by holding crypto-
currency (CC) units (see Section III). To improve the interest,
the agent can make a price offer to buy CC units from other
agents [92]. As an agent possesses more than 50% of CC units
of the system, this agent can halt and reverse any payments or
transactions. Thus, the consensus of the system is broken and
CC loses its value. Only the agent that intends to devaluate
the CC obtains the profit, e.g., law enforcement, outside the
system. The attack is typically launched in multiple stages
[61], and thus each agent, i.e., the attacker or one of other
agents, can observe the historical strategies of each other and
then optimize its own strategy. Therefore, a sequential game
can be used to model the interaction between the attacker and
other agents as proposed in [61]. In the game, the players
include one attacker and other agents. The attacker trades off
the profit of devaluating the CC against the cost of making
offers and the loss of interest. In the case that the profit of
devaluating the CC is greater than the interest of holding the
CC, by using the backward induction method, the game is
proved to admit a unique Nash equilibrium. At the equilibrium,
the attacker has an incentive to buy more than 50% of CC
units, and other agents are willing to sell the CC to the attacker
since they know that the CC has no value. However, the
attacker can succeed in its attack at no cost by announcing to
other agents about launching the majority attack before making
the price offer. The reason is that if the agents believe that the
attack succeeds, they will sell the CC to the attacker regardless
of the price that attacker offers. The Nash equilibrium may not
exist in this case.
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Fig. 9: An example that demonstrates the relationship
among blockchain user, miners and verifiers in consortium
blockchain. The miners recruit some other miners, i.e., ver-
ifiers, to verify the transaction [43].
The majority attack also exists in the PoS based consortium
blockchain [93]. In the system, the blockchain user produces
transactions for verification and pays the transaction fee. Due
to the limited number of miners, some miners can launch the
majority attack, i.e., halt or reverse transactions by forming
a cartel. Thus, in addition to competing to solve the crypto-
puzzle, the pre-selected miners recruit some other miners, i.e.,
verifiers, to verify the transaction. This results in recruitment
cost and propagation delay that reduce the utility of the pre-
selected miners [94]. In this case, the blockchain user acting as
the leader sets the transaction fee for relative secure verifica-
tion. The pre-selected miners acting as the followers, given the
other miners’ strategies, trade off the transaction propagation
delay and recruitment cost against the transaction fee offered
by the blockchain user. This scenario is illustrated in Fig 9.
Therefore, the interaction between the blockchain user and the
pre-selected miners can be modeled as a Stackelberg game as
presented in [43]. By using the second-order derivation, the
blockchain user and pre-selected miners’ utility functions are
proved to be concave. Thereby, they can jointly maximize their
utility through backward induction. The simulation results
show the bigger variation range of propagation delay brings
lower utility of the blockchain user. However, the game model
is under the assumption of complete information of the all
miners’ strategy. The Bayesian game model [95] can be used
to analyze the incomplete information case.
C. Denial of Service (DoS) Attack
Due to the distributed structure of peer-to-peer (P2P) net-
work in blockchain with the Nakamoto consensus protocol,
each miner can observe the PoW done by their peer miners
[1]. However, if the P2P network is interfered or disrupted
by some attackers, the attacked miners’ resources available
for transaction propagation and verification may be exhausted.
Thus, the attacked miners would not complete the mining
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process to gain the mining rewards and their expected profit.
Such an attack is called Denial-of-Service (DoS) [96].
The mining pools can perform the DoS attack as presented
in [62]. More specifically, to maximize the mining reward,
the mining pools can choose (i) to trigger the distributed DoS
(DDoS) attack that lowers the other mining pools’ expected
payoff, or (ii) to invest in additional computational power, e.g.,
by buying more mining machines, to increase its possibility
of solving the next PoW. Each mining pool trades off the
cost of the investment and attack associated with the other
pools’ strategies, as well as the uncertainty of launching the
attack successfully. Therefore, a non-cooperative game can
be adopted to analyze the interaction among the pools with
different sizes. In the game, there are two players, i.e., a
big pool and a small pool. The other pools own the rest
of computational power. The payoff of different strategies of
the two players can be expressed in a matrix in terms of
the computational power distribution, the increasing rate of
network’s computational power over time, and the probability
of launching the DDoS attack successfully. This matrix is
presented in Table III where Ps and Pb are the payoffs of
the small pool and the big pool, respectively.
TABLE III: Payoff matrix with launching DDoS attack
Investment(I) Attack(A)
Investment(I) Ps(I, I),Pb(I, I) Ps(I, A),Pb(I, A)
Attack(A) Ps(A, I),Pb(A, I) Ps(A,A),Pb(A,A)
Since investing in computational power is the only best
response of both big and small pools when computational
power distribution satisfies an inequality and vice versa for
launching the DDoS attack, the unique Nash equilibrium can
be obtained under different computational power distribution.
Simulation results show that mining pools have different in-
centive to perform DDoS attack under different computational
power distribution. Due to the higher expected payoff, each
pool has a greater incentive to attack larger pools than smaller
ones and the larger mining pools have a greater incentive to
perform the DDoS attack than smaller ones. These results are
consistent with the empirical evidence on the prevalence of
DDoS attacks in the Bitcoin system as presented in [96]. The
authors in [62] also consider the incentive of mining pools as a
whole. However, in a real case, the individual miners have an
incentive to hop among the pools and then the computational
power distribution changes. Thus, the Nash equilibrium may
be shifted.
Apart from only focusing on the short-term impact of DDoS
attacks on mining pools as presented in [62], the authors in
[63] study the long-term impact. An ongoing DDoS attack
causes some long-term impacts that individual miners may
migrate, i.e., leave the attacked pool and participate in other
pools. The model consists of two pools. At every stage of
mining competition, each pool chooses an attack level, i.e., the
fraction of its computational power to launch the attack to the
other pool. Choosing the attack level affects both the short-
term utility consequences (as studied in [62]) and the long-
term consequences. In particular, the long-term consequences
affect the computational power distribution of mining pools
in the next stage. Therefore, the interaction between the two
pools can be modeled as a sequential game. By using the
second-order derivative, the utility function of the mining pool,
i.e., the player, is proved to be concave under the condition
that the attack cost is greater than a certain value. This value
is associated with the level of attracting miners to participate
in the pool, and the migration rate of miners that are not
affected by the attack. Thus, the game can reach a unique
Nash equilibrium at which both the mining pools have no
incentive to launch the DDoS attack. However, if the condition
is not satisfied, the game reaches another Nash equilibrium
at which one of the players attacks while the other remains
not attacking. For the future work, a general case of multiple
mining pools can be investigated.
To avoid such DDoS attack, the authors in [64] propose
a reputation-based scheme in which each miner is assigned
a reputation value that evaluates the miner’s performance of
mining honestly against launching DDoS attack. The pool
managers send invitation probabilistically only to a subset
of miners according to the miners’ reputation values. Only
miners that receive invitations from pool managers can mine
for the pool. Otherwise, the miner has to mine for itself, and
this is not preferable for the miner with small computational
power. To maximize the profit, each miner chooses to attack
or mine honestly while optimizing the profit of launching
attack and minimizing the probability to be excluded from pool
managers’ invitation because of the decrease of its reputation
value from the attack. Since the reputation value is updated
periodically, and each miner determines its strategy based on
the future utility associated with the other miners’ reputation
value and strategy, a repeated game is used to model the
interaction among miners. By removing the strictly dominated
strategies of the game according to the miner’s utility function,
the unique Nash equilibrium can be obtained such that the best
response of each miner is not to launch the attack. Similar
to the analysis presented in [63], the reason is that even the
miner can gain some utilities in the current stage of mining
competition by launching the attack, the miner will lose many
future mining opportunities due to its lower probability of
being invited to mine for the pool. However, implementing
this reputation-based scheme through the simulation-based
approach is not discussed in the paper.
Similar to [64], a punishment scheme based on the action
record in blockchain to suppress the attack motivation is
proposed in [65]. Nevertheless, the scheme is applied to an
edge network instead of the blockchain system. The network
model consists of mobile devices and one server located in the
edge network. The mobile devices can (i) send service requests
to the server, or (ii) launch the DoS attacks to gain their
illegal profits. The server can choose (i) to execute the service
requests, or (ii) to launch the attack on the devices. Each device
or the server can decide its strategy according to the other’s
historical strategy recorded in the blockchain. Therefore, the
interaction between the mobile device and the server can be
modeled as a non-cooperative game. The utility of both the
players, i.e., the mobile device and the server, is a function
of the cost and profit of launching the attack and executing
the request, and a punishment factor related to their historical
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strategies. Since the players can maximize their utility by
not attacking under a certain constraint associated with the
punishment factor, not attacking is the best response of the
players, and thus the game can reach the Nash equilibrium.
Simulation results also show that both mobile device and edge
server tend to not attack if the punishment factor is large and
the attack rate of the server decreases compared with that of
the non-punishment scheme. However, the existence of the
Nash equilibrium may not be guaranteed in a multi-player
scenario.
D. Other Security Issues
The underlying blockchain technology of bitcoin is now
being applied to many new scenarios such as edge networks,
cloud computing, e-business and information sharing [13],
[97], [98]. In particular, a series of security problems regarding
false data sharing [40], [66], [67], distrustful goods trading
[34], [41] and cyber-insurance [44], can be resolved by using
a blockchain-based scheme.
1) False Data sharing: Blockchain-based scheme is applied
to the false data sharing scenario. In most of the traditional
data sharing application scenarios, the users transfer data either
to other users or to a centralized authority for verification.
However, the users are reluctant to share the cyber-security
information due to the concern about the distrust, the possible
false information, the privacy vulnerabilities, and the lack
of incentive [99]. To address these problems, the authors in
[66] propose a blockchain-based information sharing (iShare)
framework. In the iShare framework, organizations, i.e., users
participating in sharing cyber-attack information, receive a
reward after the information transaction is proved authentic in
the blockchain. The organizations can form a group to share
information and gain the reward together similarly to forming
the mining pool in bitcoin systems [75]. However, some group
members can form a sub-group and infiltrating in another
group to gain more profit by not releasing the information in
the infiltrated group. This is similar to launching the PBWH
attack (see Section IV-A) as presented in [35]. In the two-
group case, each group determines the number of organizations
to infiltrate to the other group to maximize its profit. Thus, the
non-cooperative game can be used to analyze the interaction
between the two groups. Each group’s utility is determined
based on the size and number of infiltrating organizations
of the two groups. Since the utility function of the group is
concave, each group can maximize its profit when the number
of infiltrating organizations satisfies the first-order optimality
condition. The unique Nash equilibrium can be obtained at
this point in which not launching the attack can be the best
response for each group. The Nash equilibrium shifts when
the number of infiltrating organizations satisfies the different
constraint and thus launching attack can also be the best
response for the group. However, a general case of multi-
groups can be investigated for the future work.
False information risk among the users and the lack of
incentive can also be found in the traditional cloud computing
scenario. The cloud users may not entirely trust the computing
results returned from the cloud provider. Thus, the verifiability
becomes a critical requirement by the cloud users. The existing
techniques, e.g., [100], for verifying correctness of the result
cannot be done at a reasonable cost. A blockchain-based
scheme with smart contract can be used to address the issue
as proposed in [40]. In the scheme, the cloud user pays two
clouds, using smart contract, for computing the same task
and then collects and crosschecks the results from the two
clouds to verify the correctness. However, the two clouds can
collude with each other, i.e., output the same wrong result,
to gain an extra profit. To maximize the utility, each cloud
chooses to compute honestly or to collude to trade off the
profit obtained from the cloud user’s payment and the loss
of the deposit, i.e., a sum of money that guarantees the
security for the delivery of the correct result. The cloud’s
expected utility function is determined based on not only its
present strategy but also the imperfect information of the other
clouds’ historical strategies over time. Thus, the extensive-
form game can be used to analyze the interaction between the
two clouds. By using the backward induction, each cloud is
proved to obtain the strictly dominant strategy that maximizes
its utility function at every information set in every sub-
game, and thus the game can reach the unique sequential
equilibrium. At the sequential equilibrium, both clouds have
no incentive to deviate from computing honestly, i.e., not to
collude. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme can
achieve a low cost compared with the techniques from [100].
The reason is that the cloud users only need to pay the cost
of employing two clouds for computing the same task.
Nevertheless, although the smart contract has the advantages
as presented in [40], a major limitation exists that only data in
the blockchain is processed, and trusted entities are required
to verify the correctness of the external data that will be
brought into the blockchain. The trusted entities can launch an
attack by manipulating the data to gain an extra profit [101].
The authors in [67] propose a decentralized entity scheme
to prevent the attack. The model consists of the voters and
the verifiers. The voter can vote, i.e., state the data as either
true or false, for random data once the voter submits a small
deposit to the system. The verifier can vote for the chosen
data after submitting a large deposit. Each participant, i.e., the
voter or the verifier, can receive a reward if its correctness
statement is the same as that of the other participants. Thus,
a coordination game can be used to analyze the interaction
between the voter and the verifier. According to the definition
of the coordination game [12], it can be easily proved that
the game has two Nash equilibria in which the participants
state the same correctness. At the Nash equilibrium, rational
participants have no incentive to deviate from voting honestly
if the majority participants give the honest statement. The
simulation results show that the proposed game can achieve a
zero probability of data manipulation.
2) Distrustful Goods Trading: The distrust of goods trading
can also be mitigated by applying blockchain based smart
contract as presented in [41]. The proposed smart contract
involves two participants, i.e., one seller and one buyer. The
participants are required to place a sufficiently large deposit
for the reliable transaction which will be returned only after
the transaction is completed. The participants can choose to
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cooperate, i.e., execute the transaction honestly, or to attack,
i.e., cheat another participant, e.g., by double spending. To
maximize the utility, each participant has to take into account
the tradoff between the cost, i.e., the loss of the deposit, and
the profit of launching the attack given the other participant’s
strategy. The seller takes its strategy before the buyer does,
and thus an extensive-form game can be formulated. The
utility of the player, i.e., the seller or the buyer, is determined
based on the deposit, the value of the goods and the price
set in the smart contract agreement. By using the backward
induction, the game is proved to admit a unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium at which both players perform the
transaction honestly. However, how to implement the proposed
smart contract is not discussed.
Using a deposit for buying and selling goods can also be
found in [34]. The transaction is insured by the deposit of both
participants, i.e., the buyer and the seller. The buyer’s strategy
profile includes (i) PC: pay and confirm the transaction, (ii)
PD: pay and leave the system with denying the transaction,
and (iii) Lb: leave the system without paying. The seller’s
strategy profile includes (i) SC: ship the goods and confirm
the transaction, (ii) SD: ship the goods and leave the system
with denying the transaction, and (iii) Ls: leave the system
without shipping. Each participant’s payoff is determined
based on the value of the goods and its deposit given the
other participant’s strategy. The interaction between the two
participants can be modeled as a normal-form game. By using
the iterative removal of dominated strategies [12], the game
is proved to have a unique Nash equilibrium if both the
participants’ deposits are greater than the goods’ value. At
the Nash equilibrium, the PC and SC strategies are the best
response of the buyer and the seller, respectively. Simulation
results show that if the deposits of both participants are greater
than the value of the goods, the sum of buyer’s money and
the value of the seller’s goods remain unchanged for the whole
system. This means that the buyer’s money is exchanged into
the goods successfully, and the seller’s goods is exchanged into
the money with no loss. However, in practice, the participant
may not be perfectly knowledgeable of the other participant’s
strategy. More sophisticated game models and tools can be
considered.
3) Cyber-Insurance: Different from suppressing the attack
motivation as presented in [34], [40], [41], [66], [67], the
authors in [44] propose a cyber-insurance scheme [102] to
compensate for the losses of the attacked blockchain partic-
ipants. The model includes multiple blockchain users, one
blockchain provider, and one cyber insurer. Each user needs
to choose a service offered by the provider and maximize its
utility given the other users’ service demands. Given the users’
demand, the provider’s problem is to invest in the computing
resource to increase its profit. To alleviate losses of being
attacked, the blockchain provider also purchases insurance
from the cyber-insurer. The cyber-insurer sets the price of the
insurance based on the perceived risk level of the provider.
Typically, the provider and the insurer offer the service first,
and the user then chooses the service. Thus, the interaction
among the users, the provider, and the insurer can be modeled
as a Stackelberg game. By exploiting the characteristics of
the Jacobian matrix [32] to analyze the utility functions of
the players, the game is proved to admit a unique Stackelberg
equilibrium. The simulation results show that the provider can
maximize its utility at a unique point which is in accordance
with the uniqueness analysis. However, in practice, the insurer
cannot completely know the risk level of the provider, and the
Bayesian game can be adopted.
V. APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY FOR MINING
MANAGEMENT
Under the Nakamoto protocol, anyone within the blockchain
network is allowed to play the role of the mining competition,
transaction dissemination and verification in order to obtain
the profit [1]. Each miner or mining pool involved manages
what strategy it will perform to maximize its payoff given
the others’ strategies, and game theory can thus be effectively
applied. In this section, we will survey the applications of
game theory in the mining management including computa-
tional power allocation, fork chain selection, block size setting,
pool selection and reward allocation.
A. Individual Mining
1) Computational Power Allocation: Bitcoin mining is a
competition that miners contend with each other by investing
in computational power to win mining rewards. To maximize
the utility, each miner determines the allocation of its computa-
tional power, i.e., whether or not to invest in the computational
power, given the other miners’ strategies. Therefore, a non-
cooperative game is applied to analyze the interaction among
the miners in [29]. The miner’s utility is a function of its
computational power, the mining rewards and the marginal
cost, i.e., the average cost for the miner to invest in a unit
of computational power. By using the second-order derivative,
the miner’s utility function is proved to be concave. Thus, a
unique Nash equilibrium exists at which investing is the best
response of each miner as long as the miner’s computational
power satisfies a condition. Here, the condition is determined
based on the computational power and the marginal cost of the
miner and the entire bitcoin network. At the equilibrium, it is
found that the decision on the investment is not affected by
the value of the mining rewards. Moreover, every miner can
have a positive utility for any level of other miners’ strategies
which consequently can prevent a monopoly.
Different from [29] in which the miners choose whether
or not to participate and then keep their chosen strategies,
the authors in [48] consider a case in which the miners can
choose “arrival”, i.e., investing in the computational power,
and “departure”, i.e., leaving the mining, at any time. In
general, the strategy of each miner depends on the state of the
blockchain network, i.e., the number of miners participating
in the mining, given other miners’ strategies. A stochastic
game can be applied to analyze the miners’ strategies as
presented in [48]. The miner’s utility is a function of the
number of the miners in the system, the arrival and departure
rates of the miners, the rate of PoW getting solved, the cost
and the reward of the mining. By transforming the utility
function to the Bellman equation [121] and then calculating
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TABLE IV: A Summary of Game Theoretical Applications for Mining Management.
REF. GAME MODEL PLAYER ACTION STRATEGY PAYOFF SOLUTION
In
di
vi
du
al
m
in
in
g
[29]
Non-cooperative
game Miners
Computational
power allocation
Selection of investment in
computational power or not
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[48] Stochastic game Miners
Computational
power allocation
Selection between investing
and leaving
Mining rewards
minus cost
Subgame perfect
equilibrium
[103] Cournot game Miners
Computational
power allocation
Determination of the amount
of investment in
computational power
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[104]
Non-cooperative
game Miners
Computational
power allocation
Selection of proper time to
start using the mining
machines
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[45]
Stackelberg
game
Service provider
and miners
Computational
power allocation
Determination of service price
and service demand Profit minus cost
Stackelberg
equilibrium
[105] Auction
Service provider
and miners
Computational
power allocation
Determination of the bid for
service Profit minus cost Individual utility
[106] Auction
Service provider
and miners
Computational
power allocation
Determination of the bid for
service Profit minus cost Social welfare
[107] Sequential game Miners Fork chain selection
Selection of reporting mined
block and mining on the
longest chain or not
Mining rewards Sequentialequilibrium
[49] Stochastic game Miners Fork chain selection Selection of branch to mine Mining rewards
Subgame perfect
equilibrium
[39]
Extensive-form
game Miners Fork chain selection
Selection of mining on the
fork or not
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[108]
Extensive-form
game Miners Fork chain selection
Selection between
strategically or stubbornly
deviating the protocol and
following the protocol
Mining rewards
minus cost and
punishment
-robust
equilibrium
[109]
Coordination
game Miners Fork chain selection
Determination of updating
blockchain version or not Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[110]
Coordination
game
Blockchain users
and miners Fork chain selection
Chosen between two fork
chains Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[111] Repeated game Miners Fork chain selection
Selection of forming the
coalition or not
Mining rewards
minus cost Social welfare
[112]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Fork chain selection
Selection of forming the
coalition or not Profit minus cost
ρ-coalition-safe
3δ Nash
equilibrium
[31]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Fork chain selection
Selection of forming the
coalition or not Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[113]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Block size setting
Determination of the block
size
Transaction fees
and mining
rewards
Nash equilibrium
[72]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Block size setting
Chosen transaction to be
included in the block
Transaction fees
and mining
rewards
Nash equilibrium
[114]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Block size setting
Chosen of upper bound of
block size Transaction fees Nash equilibrium
[37]
Extensive-form
game Miners Block size setting
Chosen transaction to be
included in the block Transaction fees
Sequential
equilibrium
[115]
Non-cooperative
game Blockchain users Block size setting
Selection of paying the
transaction fee or not
Profit minus
transaction fee Nash equilibrium
[116]
Non-cooperative
game Miners Block size setting
Selection to be included in
the committee Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
Po
ol
m
in
in
g
[117]
Coalitional
game Miners and pools Pool selection Chosen of the pool to join Mining rewards
Cooperative
equilibrium
[118]
Evolutionary
game Miners and pools Pool selection Chosen of the pool to switch
Mining rewards
minus cost Nash equilibrium
[119]
Coalitional
game Miners and pools Pool selection
Selection between forming
the pool and joining the pool Mining rewards
Non-myopic
Nash equilibrium
[30]
Non-cooperative
game
Miners and pool
manager Reward allocation
Selection of reporting shares
and allocating rewards Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[120] Repeated game
Miners and pool
manager Reward allocation
Selection of reporting shares
and allocating rewards Mining rewards Nash equilibrium
[38]
Extensive-form
game
Miners and pool
manager Reward allocation
Determination of the
computational power
allocation and optimizing the
reward allocation
Mining rewards
minus cost and
charged fee
Subgame perfect
equilibrium
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the first-order derivative, the utility function is proved to be
monotonic increasing if the cost of mining is greater than a
threshold. Thus, investing the maximum power is the dominant
strategy of each miner regardless of the state of the blockchain
network, and the game has a subgame perfect equilibrium. The
simulation results show that the utilities of the miner under
different arrival rates gradually converge to the same curve,
i.e., the game reaches the equilibrium.
In addition to the case in [29] and [48] that the miner
can only choose to invest in the computational power or not,
the authors in [103] investigate the amount of computational
power that the miner determines to invest to win the mining
rewards, given the other miners strategies. The probability that
the miner solves the PoW in a given time can be assumed to
follow an exponential distribution [1]. As such, the Nakamoto
protocol essentially formalizes an exponential race. A Cournot
game [122] can be thus used to analyze the interaction among
the miners as presented in [103]. The miner’s utility is a
function of the mining rewards, the computational power, and
the marginal cost of the investment. The game is then proved
to admit a symmetric Nash equilibrium by simply showing that
the marginal revenue, i.e., the average revenue for the miner
to invest in a unit of computational power, is equal to the
marginal cost. At the equilibrium, each miner can optimize its
investment and has no incentive to deviate from honest mining.
The aforementioned approaches, i.e., [29], [48] and [103],
consider the case that the mining reward dominates the trans-
action fee. Nevertheless, when the transaction fee dominates
the mining reward4, the miner will adjust its allocation of
computational power by choosing strategically the proper time
to start using its mining machines, i.e., the machines used for
mining process which require electricity for their operation,
to mine given the other miners’ strategies. The reason is that
miners have no incentive to mine unless the accumulated
transaction fees sufficiently exceed a certain threshold. Thus,
the non-cooperative game can be used to analyze the inter-
action among the miners as presented in [104]. Each miner’s
utility is a function of the starting time, the operation time,
the proportion of the miner’s machines, and the probability
distribution function of the block finding time. The numerical
analysis is thus used to find the Nash equilibrium of the
game. The simulation results show that the miners that own
the same number of mining machines eventually converge to
the same starting time, meaning that the game reaches the
Nash equilibrium. However, how to prove the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium is not discussed.
Although blockchain has been widely deployed in many
scenarios as presented in [29], [48], [103], [104], deploy-
ing blockchain applications in mobile environments is still
challenging because the mining process consumes high com-
putational power from mobile devices. An edge comput-
ing paradigm has been recently introduced in the mobile
blockchain networks for offloading the mining tasks of mobile
devices, i.e., the miners [42]. The system model is illustrated
4Take the bitcoin as example, the bitcoin code includes a statement which
declares that the mining reward will drop by half after about four years
(210,000 blocks). Thereby, the mining reward will eventually be dominated
by the transaction fee.
in Fig 10. However, an important issue is how to allocate
efficiently the limited edge computing resources of service
providers to the miners. The authors in [45] model the in-
teraction among the service provider and the miner as a two-
stage Stackelberg game. The service provider acts as the leader
setting the price of the service, and then the miner acts as
the follower choosing its computational service demand, given
the service price and the other miners’ strategies. The utility
of service provider is a function of the profit obtained from
charging the miners, the miners’ service demand, the time that
the miner takes to mine a block, and the cost of electricity.
The utility of the miner is a function of the computational
service demand, the service price, the cost and the rewards
of the mining. By using the backward induction, the game
is proved to admit a unique Stackelberg equilibrium which is
supported by the simulation results. However, in practice, the
players cannot know the perfect information of each other, and
the Bayesian game can be adopted.
Traditional sealed-bid auctions, e.g., the Vickrey auction
[123], can also be used to guarantee that the edge computing
resources are allocated to the miners which value the resources
most. However, designing the optimal auction is challenging.
The authors in [105] propose to apply deep learning techniques
to achieve the optimal auction for the computing resource
allocation in the blockchain network. The model consists of
one service provider, i.e., the seller or auctioneer, and multiple
mobile users as miners, i.e., bidders. The miners compete a
computing resource unit of the service provider by submitting
bids, i.e., the prices that the miners are willing to pay.
Upon receiving the bids, the service provider determines the
allocation rule, i.e., winning probabilities of the miners, and
the conditional payment rule to the miners. The allocation and
payment rules are implemented by using neural networks. The
neural networks are constructed based on an analytical solution
of the optimal auction, i.e., the Myerson theory [124]. As
such, the auction mechanism learned by the neural networks
is optimal in terms of maximizing the revenue of the service
provider while ensuring the economic properties, i.e., incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. The simulation results
show that the proposed scheme outperforms the traditional
sealed-bid auction [123] in terms of revenue. However, the
proposed scheme is constrained to a single computing resource
unit that may not meet the needs of the miners.
Different from the auction in [105] that the service provider,
i.e., the auctioneer, maximizes its individual utility, the authors
in [106] investigate the case of maximizing the social welfare
of the entire blockchain network. Under the same model as that
in [105], the utility of the mobile user and service provider is a
function of the mining rewards, the computational power, the
service price, the demand of the miner, and the robustness of
the network associated with the distribution of the computa-
tional power. By transforming the social welfare maximization
auction problem to a problem of non-monotone submodular
maximization with knapsack constraints [125], the algorithm
of achieving the social optimum can be developed. The
simulation results show that the algorithm not only achieves
the good performance in maximizing the social welfare, but
also guarantees the truthfulness, individual rationality and
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Mobile device
(bidder)
Service Provider (Auctioneer)
Mobile device 
(bidder)
Data synchronization
Mobile device
(bidder)
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Bid
Fig. 10: An example of the system model of edge computing
in mobile blockchain network. The mobile devices compete
for the computational power by submitting the bid, and the
service provider determines the allocation rule of its service.
computational efficiency. However, the algorithm is designed
for the offline auction which is not applicable for real-time
trading scenarios.
2) Fork Chain Selection: Under the Nakamoto protocol,
there are sequential PoW puzzles that the next puzzle depends
on the solution of the previous one. Since each miner needs
to choose to (i) report its found puzzle to mine on the longest
chain, or (ii) not to report the found puzzle and to the next
puzzle secretly, given the publicity of previous puzzles, fork
chain may appear. To maximize the utility, the miner trades
off reporting the puzzle to gain the mining rewards and not
reporting the puzzle to mine on fork. Meanwhile, the miner is
uncertain whether it is the first one to find the solution of the
puzzle. Thus, a sequential game with imperfect information
can be applied to model the interaction among the miners
as presented in [107]. The miner’s utility is a function of
the distribution of the computational power, the probability
of winning to solve the PoW, and the other miners’ belief of
the upcoming publicity of the puzzles. By using the backward
induction, the game is proved to admit a multiplicity of
sequential equilibrium. This means that both reporting and not
reporting can be the best response of each miner depending
on the computational power that the miner uses to solve
the puzzle. However, the authors only consider a three-miner
case, and a general case with any number of miners can be
investigated.
After finding the solution of the PoW as discussed in [107],
the miner probabilistically chooses which branch to mine, i.e.,
to choose a certain chain to attach its block to, among the tree-
like branches of the blockchain network structure. If the miner
chooses the branch which will not be the longest chain, the
miner’s effort to solve PoW is wasted. A stochastic game can
be used to analyze the strategies of the miners as presented in
[49]. The miner’s utility is determined based on the miner’s
computational power, the number of blocks solved by the
miner, the mining rewards, and the difficulty of solving the
PoW. By using the backward induction, the game is proved
that mining the longest chain is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
However, the current longest chain may not be the longest
one after several rounds of mining competition. Portions of
the historical transactions may be abandoned.
Similar to [49], the authors in [39] demonstrate that fol-
lowing the protocol, i.e., mining on the longest chain, is the
Nash equilibrium. However, the model in [39] is based on the
PoS system in which the fork chain randomly selects the coin
from the set of coins owned by miners at each time step (see
Section III). Thus, an extensive-form game can be applied.
The miner chooses whether or not to mine on the fork, given
the other miners’ strategies. The miner’s utility is a function
of the stake, the mining rewards, the coins of miners selected
by the fork, and a discounted factor. Since the cost of mining
on the fork increases with the miner’s stake, for a sufficiently
large stake of the miner, the cost overweighs the profit gained
from the mining rewards. By restricting access to the miners
with the large stake, the rest of miners have no incentive to
deviate from mining on the longest chain, and the game thus
reaches the Nash equilibrium. Empirical data obtained from
Blockchain.info [90] supports the theoretical analysis.
Extended from [39], the authors in [108] investigate the
case of miners choosing the fork chain in an upgraded PoS
system. In the upgraded system, the latest block is called the
parent block, and concurrent blocks attached to the parent
block are called the leaf blocks. Instead of following the
longest chain protocol, miners can choose the leaf blocks
to be attached to the parent block. To model the interaction
among the miners in the tree-like structure of the system, an
extensive-form game can be applied. The miners’ strategies
include deviating from the protocol stubbornly, following the
protocol, and strategically choosing whether or not to deviate
from the protocol to maximize their utility. Since there is only
one leaf block that can reach the consensus to win the reward,
the utility of the miner is a function of the reward, the cost
of losing the block, and the punishment of deviating from the
protocol, given the other miners’ strategies. The punishment
is implemented by taking away the deposit of the miner that is
deposited in advance. When the fraction of the stubborn miners
is less than 1/3, each miner cannot increase its utility more
than  or decrease its utility more than 1/ by deviating from
the protocol. Thus, the game has a unique -robust equilibrium
[116]. The simulation results show that only when the fraction
of the deviated miners is greater than a quarter, the utilities
of the miners that follow the protocol decrease, as the number
of the deviated miners increases. This is consistent with the
theoretical analysis.
Furthermore, when the fork chain appears, the miners need
to decide whether to update the blockchain version, i.e.,
to acknowledge the fork as a hard fork or not. The hard
fork is a permanent divergence from the previous version
of the blockchain which requires the miners to upgrade the
blockchain software. Since having more miners participating
in a particular chain version increases the value of the version,
the miner’s strategy depends on not only its individual profit,
but also the other miners’ profits. Thus, a coordination game
can be used as presented in [109]. In the game, the miner
gains a zero-profit if the miner’s strategy is not consistent
with those of the majority of miners, and thus the game is
admitted a unique Nash equilibrium. At the equilibrium, every
miner chooses to stay on the current version or to upgrade
the version. However, organizing the voting of upgrading the
blockchain version remains a topic for further research.
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Similar to [109], the authors in [110] propose to use the
coordination game approach for choosing the fork chain.
However, the players in the game in [110] include blockchain
users and miners. To maximize the utility, both types of players
need to choose between two fork chains to participate. Here,
the utility of a blockchain user is a function of the users’
distribution of choosing certain chain, the transaction fees, and
the strategies of the miners. The miner’s utility is a function
of the distribution of the users between two fork chains,
the computational power, the mining rewards, and the other
miners’ choice of the chain. If the number of the blockchain
users choosing a certain chain is greater than a threshold, the
utility of the players can be proved to be monotonous. Thus,
the game has a unique Nash equilibrium that all of the players
choose the same chain. Otherwise, a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium exists such that players choose the chain randomly.
The simulation results show that the user will choose to remain
on a certain chain when the number of the users on this chain
is greater than a certain value which is in accordance with the
theoretical analysis. However, the case which involves multiple
fork chains can also be investigated.
The aforementioned approaches, i.e., [109] and [110], show
that the miners can coordinate, i.e., through forming a coali-
tion, to increase their utilities by deviating from the honest
mining. To address this issue, the authors in [111] propose an
upgrade scheme for the blockchain protocol. In the upgrade
scheme, the mining reward is delayed to allocate to the
miner that finds the solution of the PoW. Also, the miner
can receive variable discounted rewards during several rounds
of mining after the miner finds the solution. Extended from
the coordination game model in [110] to its infinite form, a
repeated game is then adopted in [111] where each miner
chooses whether to form the coalition or not in every round
of mining. The utility of each miner is a function of its
computational power, the mining rewards, the difficulty of
solving the PoW, the cost of mining, the number of rounds for
allocating the discounted rewards, and the discounted factor
of the rewards. It is approved that if the discounted factor
meets an inequality, the miner’s utility of honest mining is
greater than that of forming the coalition. This means that
the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium at which
the inequality is satisfied, and all the miners perform honest
mining.
Similar to [111], the authors in [112] propose a scheme
to prevent the miners from forming the coalition. In the
scheme, the transactions are first included in a buffer block,
and the miner mines on the buffer block by solving the PoW.
Only after the buffer block is broadcast and verified, this
buffer block becomes the real block and will be attached
to the blockchain. The miner can choose whether or not to
form the coalition, i.e., deviating from the honest mining,
given the other miners’ strategies. Thus, the interaction among
the miners can be modeled as a non-cooperative game. The
miner’s utility is a function of the computational power, the
number of the blocks in a round of mining, the difficulty of
solving the PoW, the distance between the buffer block and
the blockchain, the cost and the rewards of mining, and the
transaction fees. By calculating the ratio of the upper bound
to the lower bound of the coalition’s profit, the multiplicative
increase in utility is proved to be less than (1 + 3δ). Here,
the coalition controls less than a ρ < 1/2 fraction of the
computational power, and the constant satisfies δ < 0.3. This
means that no coalition that controls less than a fraction ρ of
the computational power can gain more than a factor (1+3δ)
of the mining rewards and transaction fees by deviating from
the protocol. Therefore, the game has a ρ-coalition-safe 3δ
Nash equilibrium.
Different from the PoW based coalition as discussed in
[109]–[111], the coalition in the PoS based system is inves-
tigated in [31]. In PoS, the miner’s stake, i.e., a parameter
associated with the amount of the miner’s cryptocurrency and
the time that miner has been holding the cryptocurrency, is
updated at the end of each round of mining and the stake
will be reset to zero after the miner discovers the block
(see Section III). The higher stake means less difficulty in
mining the block. Thereby, the miner chooses whether or not
to form the coalition for holding more stakes to lower the
mining difficulty, given the other miners’ strategy. Thus, a
non-cooperative game can be applied. The miner’s utility is
a function of the stake, the mining rewards, the number of
times that the miner discovers the block and transactions to be
included in the block. Since the miners of the coalition, even
deviating from the protocol, cannot obtain the utility which
exceeds that of the non-coalition, the game is thus proved to
have a unique Nash equilibrium at which every miner follows
the protocol. However, forming the coalition is not the only
way to increase the miner’s stake. To increase the holding time
and thereby increase the stake, the miner has an incentive to
hold its cryptocurrency without mining. As a result, there is
no mining miner, and the entire blockchain network crashes.
3) Block Size Setting: When mining the bitcoin, the miner
can earn more transaction fees by including more transactions
in its block. However, it also decreases the miner’s probability
of gaining the mining reward [73] for a number of reasons,
e.g., resulting in a longer propagation time for reaching a
consensus. Each miner needs to determine strategically the
block size, i.e., the number of transactions to be included
in a block, to maximize its utility, given the other miners’
strategies. Thus, the authors in [113] model a two-miner case
as a non-cooperative game. The miner’s utility is a function of
its computational power, block size, and the time to reach the
consensus. Since the first-order derivative of the miner’s utility
function with respect to the block size is always less than zero
when the unit transaction fee and the mining reward meet a
certain condition, the strategy that all of the miners include
no transaction in their block is a unique Nash equilibrium.
However, if the transaction fee or the mining reward change,
the Nash equilibrium shifts to the strategy that all of the miners
include transactions in their block.
To avoid the case that all miners include no transaction
in their block as presented in [113], the authors in [72]
demonstrate the necessity of setting the maximum block size.
Same as the game approach as presented in [113], the miner
chooses the transactions to be included in a block at every
round of the mining competition. The miner’s utility is a
function of its computational power and the transaction fees
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associated with the block size and the bitcoin mining reward.
The transactions that one miner does not include in its block
will be included by another miner before the next round of the
mining competition. Thus, when the block size is unlimited,
the strategy of including all transactions by all the miners
regardless of the fee is the unique Nash equilibrium. It is also
found that unbounded transaction fee leads to the same Nash
equilibrium. However, inflations of the computational power
distribution may have an impact on the existence of the Nash
equilibrium of the game.
An analysis of setting a proper block size can also be found
in [114]. The authors propose a Bitcoin-unlimited scheme to
increase the throughput of the bitcoin system. In the scheme,
each miner chooses its own upper bound of the block size,
and invalidates and discards the excessive block, i.e., the block
with the size larger than its upper bound. To maximize the util-
ity, the miner trades off the transaction fees and the probability
of its block being orphaned based on its mining power, given
the other miners’ strategies. Thus, a non-cooperative game can
be used to model the interaction among the miners. Since any
miner that chooses different upper bound gains zero utility, the
game is proved to admit a unique Nash equilibrium at which
all miners choose the same upper bound. Since only the blocks
with appropriate sizes would be added to the blockchain, the
block size under the proposed scheme gradually increases to
the maximum limit associated with the network capacity. This
means that the divergence on the block size is always bounded
and the throughput of the system increases. The simulation
results show that if all miners have different bounds, the
miners that possess large computational power intend to form
a coalition to gain extra profit. However, this is harmful to
maintaining the bitcoin’s decentralized structure.
However, the unlimited block size [114] may not lead to a
higher throughput of the bitcoin system. The reason is that any
two blocks may have collisions, i.e., the miners simultaneously
choose the same subset of transactions to be included in the
blocks. This situation wastes the computational power for ver-
ification and lowers the throughput of the system. To address
this issue, the authors in [37] propose an alternative bitcoin
protocol. In the protocol, the system selectively incorporates
transactions of off-chain blocks into the main chain and awards
creators, i.e., miners, of the accepted transactions even if the
creators’ blocks are not part of the main chain. Each miner
chooses the transactions to be included in its block and trades
off the transaction fees and probability of the collision. The
miners are partially aware of other miners’ strategies and take
their strategies sequentially. Thus, an extensive-form game
can be used to model the interaction among the miners. The
utility of the miner is a function of the position of its block
in the main chain, the discount factor, and the fees of the
chosen transactions. By using the backward induction, the
game is proved to admit a sequential equilibrium at which the
miners probabilistically choose the transaction to minimize the
collision. As a result, the proposed protocol achieves a higher
throughput which is consistent with the simulation analysis.
However, the game has several other Nash equilibria at which
the miners’ utilities are much less than that of the sequential
equilibrium.
Moreover, even with the unlimited block size as presented in
[114], there is still a limitation on transactions to be included
in the block. The limitation is imposed by the waiting time,
i.e., the time that a transaction of the blockchain user waits in
a queue to be included in the block. The blockchain user can
choose (i) to pay a transaction fee to the miner to reduce the
waiting time, or (ii) not to pay any fee and may experience
a longer waiting time. The miner can decide to stay on or
to leave the mining according to the expected profit of the
transaction fees and the cost. Thus, the interaction between
the miners and the users can be modeled as a non-cooperative
game as presented in [115]. The miner’s utility is a function
of the number of miners in the network, the rate of solving
the PoW, the exchange rate between the bitcoin value and
the dollar, the transaction fees, the rewards and the cost of
the mining. The user’s utility is a function of the exchange
rate, the transaction fee, the waiting time, the profit of the
included transaction, and the fraction of users that pay the
fee. The constraint between the number of miners and the
rate of solving the PoW can be obtained, when the miner’s
and the user’s utility are both greater than zero. This means
that if the constraint is satisfied, the game has a unique Nash
equilibrium. At the equilibrium, the miner chooses to stay on
the mining and the user chooses to pay the transaction fee.
Empirical evidence from blockchain.info [90] is implemented
to validate the theoretical analysis. However, multiple Nash
equilibria can exist if the constraint is not satisfied.
As presented in [115] that the waiting time limits the
throughput of the blockchain network, the authors in [116]
propose a novel protocol that greatly reduces the waiting time
of the transaction to reach the Nakamoto consensus. In the
protocol, there is a committee including a certain number
of members, i.e., miners. The block found by any miner
is verified only when the majority of members reach the
consensus. This miner is then selected as a member in the
committee and ranked based on its computational power. The
utility of the member is a function of the computational power,
the mining rewards and the other members’ strategy. Thus, a
non-cooperative game can be applied. Since the member gains
the positive profit only when the member follows the protocol,
i.e., chooses the block with higher rank, the game is proved to
admit a unique Nash equilibrium. At the equilibrium, the chain
is never forked and the confirmation time for preventing from
the double spending is unnecessary. As a result, the throughput
of entire the blockchain network increases.
B. Pool Mining
1) Pool Selection: To reduce the volatility of the mining
rewards and to maximize the utility, miners can form a coali-
tion, i.e., mining pool [75], and cooperate with the members,
i.e., miners in the pool, by following the reward allocation of
the pool. Thus, a coalitional game [11] can be used to analyze
the interaction among the miners and the pools as presented in
[117]. Since the communication delay of the bitcoin network
leads to the non-linearity of the pool’s mining rewards, the
rewards cannot be distributed stably among the members. This
means that there are always some miners having an incentive
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to leave their pools and join other pools to increase their
utility. As a result, no cooperative equilibrium exists in the
game. Additionally, as more transactions are processed in the
bitcoin system, the non-linearity effect on the mining rewards
increases, and thus miners are more likely to switch pools,
i.e., select and join the pool which benefits them most.
During pool selection, each miner first randomly selects a
mining pool to start mining with and then switches to another
pool after a time period according to its expected utility.
The distribution of the miners in mining pools of the whole
blockchain network evolves over time based on the miners’
strategies. Thus, the framework of evolutionary game [126]
can be used to analyze the dynamic process of the miners’
pool selection as proposed in [118]. If the replicator dynamics
[127], i.e., the growth rate of the size of the pools, is equal
to zero, the distribution of the miners reaches evolutionary
stability [128]. Here, the utility of the miner is a function of
its computational power, propagation delay, the mining reward
and the mining cost. By exploiting the characteristics of the
Jacobian matrix of the replicator dynamics in a two-mining-
pool network, the game is proved to admit conditionally a
unique Nash equilibrium, i.e., the evolutionary stability.
The miners in a PoS system can also form coalitions, i.e.,
pools, to increase their utilities. The miners need to trade off
the cost and the expected profit of forming the pool. For
this, each miner chooses (i) to form a pool as a leader, or
(ii) to allocate its stake to pools that are already created by
the other miners given the reward scheme of the system. In
particular, the miner first determines the amount of stake to be
allocated to be the leader and then calculates the best possible
allocation of mining rewards. Thus, a coalitional game can
be applied to analyze the respective aspect of interactions
among the miners and the pools as presented in [119]. The
results of backward induction illustrate that both the games
have a unique non-myopic Nash equilibrium [129]. At the
equilibrium, the certain number of pools are formed with
the same size. The rewards are distributed evenly among all
miners, except for pool leaders that get an additional gain. The
simulation results show that starting from no pool, the game
quickly converges to multiple pools of an equal size which is
consistent with the theoretical analysis.
2) Reward Allocation: Admittedly, the mining pool’s re-
ward allocation, i.e., the algorithm used to share mining
rewards among miners, has a significant impact on the utilities
of the miners [75]. The miner can choose to report shares, i.e.,
preimage solutions for a block that meets the requirement set
by the pool manager [25], immediately or to delay the report-
ing given the reward allocation of the pool. The pool manager
needs to select the reward allocation algorithm according to
the miners’ expected utility. Thus, a non-cooperative game
can be used to analyze the interactions between the miners
and the pool manager as presented in [30]. If a certain
condition is satisfied, the strategy that each miner reports
the shares immediately is the Nash equilibrium. Here, the
condition is associated with the miner’s computational power,
the probability of finding the full solution of the PoW, the
number of reported shares, and the number of the completed
rounds of the mining competition.
However, the approach proposed in [30] considers only
the single share. Namely, each miner reports the share only
one time during mining. In practice, the miners can report
the shares repeatedly, and the pool manager can optimize its
reward allocation to maximize its utility. Thus, a repeated
game can be applied as presented in [120]. The game is
proved that the pool manager can use the geometric-pay, i.e.,
a certain reward function, to achieve the social optimum.
The simulation results show that the expected utility of the
geometric-pay pool, i.e., the pool that allocates its mining
rewards following geometric distribution, is greater than those
of both the proportional pay pool, i.e., the pool that shares
mining rewards evenly among the shares, and the PPLNS pool
which is in accordance with the theoretical analysis.
As the miners participate in mining pools to reduce the
volatility of the mining rewards, a large pool may become
even larger. It may lead to a centralization against to the funda-
mental decentralized structure of the blockchain. However, the
authors in [38] demonstrate that this situation will not happen.
During each round of mining, the miner chooses to allocate its
computational power to a certain pool according to the state
of the blockchain, i.e., the distribution of computational power
among the pools. The pool manager adjusts the fees charged
to the participated miners to maximize its profit, given the
state of the blockchain. Thus, an extensive-form game can
be applied to analyze the interaction between the miners and
the pool managers as presented in [38]. The miner’s utility
is a function of the computational power, fee charged by the
pool, the distribution of miners among the pools, the cost and
the rewards of the mining. If the fee charged by the pool
manager satisfies a condition, the game reaches a subgame
perfect equilibrium. Here, the condition is associated with the
number of the remaining miners in the same pool. At the
equilibrium, the large pools charge a higher fee than the small
pools. The miners thus choose the small pools to participate
to maximize their utility. As a result, the centralization will
not happen. Empirical evidence from Bitcoinity and Bitcoin
Wiki supports the theoretical analysis.
VI. APPLICATIONS OF GAME THEORY ATOP BLOCKCHAIN
PLATFORM
A. Crypto-currency Economic
1) Transaction Transparency: Under the Nakamoto proto-
col, the entire history records linked to the transaction are
transparent to all the blockchain miners and users. This may
cause a series of problems. For example, blockchain miners
intend to include the transaction in high quality, i.e., most of
the history of the transaction is legalized and reliable, into the
block rather than the transaction in low quality. The reason
is that the transactions that can be traced back to the darknet
markets or ransomware payment may be added to the blacklist
of the government. The large transaction in not high quality
may thus be orphaned by the miners regarding the possible
huge loss. To mitigate the risk of transaction in not high quality
being orphaned, the user mixes strategically its payment, i.e.,
splits its payment of transaction into several small ones in
different qualities. This scenario is illustrated as in Fig. 11.
21
Since the miner’s possible loss decreases due to the smaller
size of the transaction, the transaction that is not in high quality
may be included into the block. The user checks the quality of
the other user’s transaction sequentially and a sequential game
can thus be used to analyze the interaction among the users as
presented in [130]. The user’s utility is a function of the quality
of the transaction, the value of the post-transaction and the
cost of mixing the payment. By using the backward induction,
the game is proved to admit multiple subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. At the equilibrium, each user mixes their payment
in a single transaction instead of sending multiple individual
transactions. However, the transaction size, the cost and the
rewards of mining can be taken into account in a more general
case.
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Fig. 11: An example of the mixing payment: the transaction
A is discovered to be a ransom payment and all of its outputs
are added to the blacklist. The transaction B is in high quality.
To avoid transaction C to be orphaned by the miners, the user
mixes the payment of the transaction C by the payment of
transaction A and transaction B.
Under the scenario in [130], the user that mixes the payment
of transaction makes money flows more difficult to trace. This
is harmful for the entire blockchain system. To address this
issue, the authors in [131] investigate the optimal level of
transaction transparency and propose a reliable trading system.
Since each blockchain user has a unique public key, the
user can use the crypto-currency to trade goods with another
user directly. To avoid the transaction information, e.g., the
ownership of a certain sum of money, being exploited for
crime, the proposed system restricts the user’s ability to view
the complete transaction information attached to the public
keys. Thereby, before delivering the goods for trading to other
users, the user trades off the expected profit and possible loss
in terms of the incomplete transaction information to choose
whether or not to perform the trading. The trading can thus
be organized as an infinitely repeated game in discrete time
as presented in [131]. The user’s utility is a function of the
trading quantity, trading price, the probability of the trade
being performed, the allocation of the goods for trading, and
the cost of trading. By defining the inequality that the user’s
utility of offering a positive trading price is greater than that
of the offering a zero trading price, i.e., the transaction failure,
the constraint between the trading price and the allocation can
be obtained. This means that if the constraint is satisfied, the
game has multiple Nash equilibria. In any equilibrium of the
game, the user has an incentive to split large transaction into
small ones and trades with several other users.
Although the transparency of transaction information causes
a series of problems, e.g., malicious uses of information,
as presented in [130] and [131], it enables the entrant, i.e.,
the new blockchain user, to possess an endogenous high
reputation, i.e., the ability of performing the reliable trading.
Thereby, potential users have more incentive to enter the trad-
ing system compared with the traditional real-world trading
system where only the user that has high reputation can attract
customers to trade with. Although the blockchain-based trad-
ing system facilitates the entry for potential entrant, the trading
competition in the system increases and collusion among the
users arises due to the information transparency. Thus, each
potential entrant chooses whether or not to enter the system
regarding the trade-off between the expected utility after the
entry and the enhanced competition as well as collusion, given
the other entrants’ strategies. Since the potential entrant makes
its choice repeatedly in discrete time period, a repeated game
can be applied as presented in [132]. The entrant’s utility
is a function of the probability that one customer joins the
trading in a time period, the probabilistic distribution of the
reputation, the profit that can be obtained by the trading and
the cost of entry. Since both the utility of the entrant and
the social welfare of the system are higher than those of the
traditional trading system, each potential entrant entering the
system is proved to be the Nash equilibrium. However, the
balance between transparency and privacy of the blockchain
trading system still remains a topic for further research.
2) Crypto-currency Value: In the last decade, hundreds
of crypto-currencies are adopted in the worldwide financial
market. Each crypto-currency has its value which depends
on its transaction rate, transaction fees, mining rewards and
its fiat exchange rate. The miners need to choose a certain
currency to mine according to the value of the crypto-currency
and the competition from the other miners. Given the other
miners’ strategies, the miner can choose to keep mining on
the same crypto-currency or change its strategy to mine on
another one. Since the incentive of all miners, i.e., players, to
change their strategy can be expressed using a single global
function, i.e., the potential function [135], the potential game
can be applied as presented in [133]. The potential function is
of the distribution of the miners on mining different crypto-
currencies, the computational power, the value and the reward
allocation of the crypto-currencies. By using the induction
of the better-response learning algorithm [135], the game is
proved to admit more than one Nash equilibrium. However,
how to achieve a desired equilibrium is not discussed.
The authors in [36] further investigate the relationship
between the value of the crypto-currencies and the population
size of the users. Given a certain blockchain-based crypto-
currency, the user can choose whether or not to participate
in the blockchain platform with a cost and to hold a cer-
tain amount of the crypto-currency, given the other users’
strategies. Since the user makes its strategy based on the
productivity of the blockchain platform, i.e., the state which
represents the quality or the usefulness of the blockchain
platform, an extensive-form game can be adopted to analyze
the interaction among the users as presented in [36]. The user’s
utility is a function of the transaction supply and demand, the
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TABLE V: A Summary of Game Theoretical Applications for Crypto-currency Economic.
REF. GAME MODEL PLAYER ACTION STRATEGY PAYOFF SOLUTION
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[130]
Sequencial
game Blockchain users
Setting transaction
transparency Selection of mixing payments Profits minus cost
Subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium
[131] Repeated game Blockchain users
Setting transaction
transparency
Selection of performing
trading or not
Function of
expected profits
and possible loss
Nash equilibrium
[132] Repeated game Blockchain users
Setting transaction
transparency
Chosen of entering the system
or not Profits minus cost Nash equilibrium
[133] Potential game Miners
Determination of the
crypto-currency
value
Selection between keeping
mining and switching to mine
on another coin
Crypto-currency
value and mining
rewards
Nash equilibrium
[36]
Extensive-form
game Blockchain users
Determination of the
crypto-currency
value
Chosen of entering the system
or not Profits minus cost
Markov
equilibrium
[134]
Non-cooperative
game Blockchain users
Determination of the
crypto-currency
value
Determination of the
allocation of real money and
investment in computational
power
Function of
computational
power and
population size of
users
Nash equilibrium
size of the blockchain users, the participation cost and the
profit of holding the crypto-currency. By exploiting the char-
acteristics of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
[136] transformed from the user’s utility, the game is proved
to admit a unique Markov equilibrium. At the equilibrium,
the high crypto-currency value attracts more potential users
to participate which reflects the future growth of the user
population size, and the expectation of future growth leads
reciprocally to a higher crypto-currency value.
Similar to [36], the authors in [134] demonstrate that the
value of the crypto-currency is derived by the computational
power of the blockchain network and the population size of
the users. The user determines the amount of real money
to be allocated in the transaction in the blockchain, and the
miner determines the investment in the computational power
in exchange for the mining profit according to the strategies
of both the other users and miners. A non-cooperative game
can thus be applied as presented in [134]. The larger number
of users attract more investment in computational power,
and more computational power means the stronger consen-
sus within the blockchain network and the higher crypto-
currency value, and thereby leads to more users to participate
in the blockchain network. Thus, the reciprocal interaction
between the computational power and the user population size
captures the equilibrium value of the crypto-currency. This
equilibrium value of crypto-currency depends on the users’
preferences, e.g., the risk aversion and the censorship aversion,
and the usefulness of the network. The empirical data from
Blockchain.info [90] supports the theoretical analysis.
B. Energy Trading
Increasing distributed renewable energy users, e.g., solar
rooftops and energy storage units, gradually changes the
centralized structure of conventional power system. The rea-
son is that the distributed energy users produce the energy
and thereby users can trade their energy with each other
directly. Therefore, by utilizing the decentralized structure of
the blockchain network for trading information exchange, the
blockchain-based energy trading systems are proposed. Each
energy user in the system can decide the amount of energy to
(i) buy from the conventional power system, (ii) buy renewable
energy from other users, (iii) store its harvest energy, and (iv)
sell its energy to the other users.
When the energy exchange price is set by the users, the
interactions among the users can be modeled as games. For
example, in [137], a potential game [135] is applied to achieve
the social optimum. Considering the energy demand variation,
a non-cooperative game is adopted in [138]. The authors in
[94] propose a credit-based energy trading system and model
the interaction between the users and the credit bank as a
Stackelberg game. Otherwise, when the energy exchange price
is set by the system where the users bid for the exchange
price, the auction models can be applied to achieve the social
optimum as presented in [139] and [140].
VII. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In Sections IV, V, and VI, we provide an in-depth survey on
applications of game theory to address a wide range of issues
in the blockchain networks and related systems. However, with
the fast evolution of the blockchain technologies and their
applications, a plethora of emerging problems remain open
for further studies, many of which can be solved using game
theory. In this section, we expand our discussion to some
challenges as well as research directions with blockchain,
where the mathematical tools of game theory may exert further
potential for system analysis and mechanism design.
A. Challenges from Game Theory Perspective
1) Existence of Nash Equilibria: Most references reviewed
in this survey discuss the existence of the unique Nash equi-
librium. At the Nash equilibrium, the players, e.g., the miners
or the pools, have no incentive to deviate from their current
strategies. However, in practice, multiple Nash equilibra can
exist, and thus it is challenging for the players to choose
the optimal strategy or solution. For example, for the mining
management [115], with the existence of Nash equilibra, the
miners can choose between staying and leaving, and the
blockchain users choose between paying or not paying the
transaction fee. In this case, finding the solution among the
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Nash equilibria to achieve a social optimum for the whole
network is a challenge. Similarly, for the crypto-currency
economic [133], how to achieve a social optimal equilibrium
in the crypto-currency market is very challenging.
2) Implementation of Game Models: The applied game
models proposed in aforementioned reviews have its limi-
tation. For example, due to the first-mover advantage, the
Stackelberg game is widely used to solve many issues in
blockchain network. However, the blockchain network is a
type of decentralized system with a number of distributed
nodes, i.e., players. Therefore, how leader nodes observe
the strategy of each follower node, make optimal decisions,
and find the equilibrium is one big challenge. To address
the challenge, the meanfield games [141] can be applied for
analyzing the performance of the whole blockchain network
with large number of miners where individual miners have
relatively negligible impact upon the network. In addition,
evolutionary games can be adopted for analyzing mining
pools’ formation and evolution. Stochastic games can be
used for analyzing more complex scenarios, such as miners’
probabilistic selection of transactions to be included, blocks to
be verified and broadcast, and chains to be attached and mine.
B. Open Issues and Research Directions for Applications of
Game Theory in Blockchain
1) Throughput Improvement: Blockchain technologies have
been adopted in a number of scenarios. However, the through-
put, i.e., capacity of processing requested transactions, of
blockchain networks limits the scope of blockchain applica-
tions. The major reasons for this issue are the long block
creation time and limited block size [113]. However, block
creation time and the block size cannot be easily changed
for improving the throughput. The analyses in [114] show
that miners intend to form a coalition if the block size is
unlimited. This is harmful to maintaining the decentralized
structure of the blockchain network. Also, the authors in [115]
demonstrate that even with the unlimited block size, there is
still a limitation on throughput imposed by the waiting time
for transactions to be included in blocks. Thus, to improve
the throughput, blockchain protocols in terms of the efficient
block creation and the proper block size need to be further
developed, and game theory can be a useful tool.
2) Alternative Consensus Mechanisms: In blockchain net-
works, e.g., PoW networks, every node performs several
certain tasks to maintain the consensus across the blockchain.
However, reaching the consensus needs nodes to repeat tasks
consuming a large amount of electricity [29]. Thus, an al-
ternative consensus mechanism to PoW such as Proof of
Useful Work or Resources (PoUWR) [142] may be used.
For example, computing hash value in PoW network can be
replaced with performing stochastic gradient descent for neural
network training [142]. Due to the difference between the
tasks in terms of data volume, expected accuracy and variable
dimension, the strategies of nodes to obtain a puzzle solution
are different from those in the PoW network. Therefore, it is
necessary to apply game approaches to analyze the interaction
among nodes in the process of PoUWR competition, e.g., the
computational power allocation between PoUWR and PoW,
the tradeoff between the payoff and the cost, and security
issues regarding the deviation from the PoUWR protocol.
3) Permissioned Ledger Types: Public blockchain has been
adopted in many applications. Public blockchain allows any-
one to participate to be a node, and it has no control by regu-
latory agencies, industries, or governments. In addition to the
public blockchain, permissioned blockchain ledger types such
as consortium blockchain, become another interesting appli-
cation of Nakamoto’s blockchain implementation. Consortium
blockchains can be considered to be semi-decentralization. The
reason is that not everyone can participate in the network,
and the consortium blockchain is maintained by a group of
pre-selected nodes, allowing for a greater degree of con-
trol over the network by regulators. As such, the consor-
tium blockchains involve multiple entities and stake-holders,
i.e., the pre-selected nodes, the verification nodes, and the
blockchain users. To model and analyze complex interactions
among the entities and stake-holders, game theory can be
adopted as a useful tool. For example, the non-cooperative
games can be used to analyze the pre-selected node selection,
Stakeleberg games can be applied to analyze the interaction
between the pre-selected nodes, i.e., the leaders, and the
verification nodes, i.e., the followers. Also, evolutionary games
can be used to analyze the formation of mining pools in
permissioned blockchain networks.
4) Incorporating Blockchain Technologies into Other Sce-
narios: As blockchain is a versatile technology, it is also
possible to incorporate blockchain into other emerging net-
work and application scenarios. For example, the authors in
[45] introduce a blockchain-based edge computing paradigm
in which mobile users offload their computing tasks to com-
puting service providers and pay the corresponding fees. This
paradigm addresses the implementation issue of blockchain
applications on resource-limited mobile services. However, the
blockchain-based edge computing paradigm raises resource
management issues. For example, how to motivate the service
providers to contribute their computing resources. Game the-
ory can be efficiently used to design incentive mechanisms.
For example, auction schemes can be adopted to improve
the utility or revenue of the service providers. Also, the
Stackelberg game can be applied to improve both the utility
of the computing service providers and the mobile users.
Predictably, by taking advantage of game theory to analyze
and design incentive mechanisms, blockchain technologies can
be widely incorporated into multi-agent scenarios beyond the
crypto-currencies, e.g., mobile blockchain networks, informa-
tion sharing scenarios, and energy trading markets.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented a comprehensive survey of the
applications of game theory in blockchain. Firstly, we have
given an overview of blockchain with its structure, workflow,
and incentive compatibility. Then, we have introduced the
basic knowledge of game theory and several game models
with the objective to understand the motivations of using
game theory to analyze interactions among different compo-
nents in blockchain. Afterwards, we have provided reviews
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and analyses using game theory in detail to deal with a
variety of problems regarding security, mining management
and blockchain applications. Finally, we have outlined existing
challenges as well as future research directions.
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